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INTERLOCUTORY REVIEW OF DISCOVERY
ORDERS: AN IDEA WHOSE TIME
HAS COME
by Elizabeth G. Thornburg*
NO ONE cares much for either discovery disputes or for interlocu-
tory review, and so the combination should be deadly. Indeed,
courts' and commentators 2 have few good things to say about
either, and the prospect of interlocutory review of discovery orders makes
some people apoplectic.3 Fears about interlocutory review, however, are
based primarily on theory, and few have attempted to determine whether
empirical data supports their fears.
4
This Article undertakes an empirical and analytical study of interlocutory
review of discovery orders. The Article examines court systems that allow
interlocutory review of discovery orders. 5 In addition to a general review of
nationwide case law, this Article describes an original empirical case study
of all of the reported discovery mandamus opinions in the state of Texas
from 1983 through June of 1989, and all of the discovery mandamus cases,
whether reported or not, in the state's busiest intermediate appellate court
from 1988 to mid-1989. Texas provides a unique source of this empirical
* Assistant Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University. B.A., College of William
& Mary, 1976; J.D., Southern Methodist University, 1979.
1. See Lauro Lines S.R.L. v. Chasser, 109 S. Ct. 1976, 1980, 104 L. Ed. 2d 548, 556
(1989) ("While it is true that the 'right not to be sued elsewhere than in Naples' is ... posi-
tively destroyed... by permitting the trial to occur and reversing its outcome, that is vindica-
tion enough because the right is not sufficiently important to overcome the policies militating
against interlocutory appeals.") (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Richardson-Merrell Inc. v.
Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 436 (1985) ("The possibility that a ruling may be erroneous and may
impose additional litigation expense is not sufficient to set aside the finality requirement im-
posed by Congress.")
2. Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique and Proposals for
Change, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1296 (1978); Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate
Courts, 41 MINN. L. REV. 751, 776 (1957).
3. "In a large and complicated lawsuit... interlocutory review of such housekeeping
matters as discovery would practically preclude termination of the litigation by settlement or
trial within the normal lifespan of any of the parties, attorneys or judges." Federal Civil Appel-
late Jurisdiction: An Interlocutory Restatement, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 13, 220 (Spring
1984) [hereinafter Appellate Jurisdiction]; cf C. DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE (Bantam ed. 1983).
4. R. MACCRATE, J. HOPKINS & M. ROSENBERG, APPELLATE JUSTICE IN NEW YORK
108 (1982) [hereinafter MACCRATE, APPELLATE JUSTICE] (suggesting a new study distin-
guishing among kinds of interlocutory orders).
5. See Jampole v. Touchy, 673 S.W.2d 569 (Tex. 1984). See generally Comment, The
Expanding Use of Mandamus to Review Texas District Court Discovery Orders: An Immediate




data because it allows interlocutory review of discovery orders, but not most
other discretionary pretrial orders, 6 thus allowing analysis of the effects of
interlocutory review of discovery orders in isolation.
A study of the effect of interlocutory review of discovery orders also re-
quires weaving together three separate strands of existing empirical research
at the national level. First, studies of caseloads and case processing time at
the trial and appellate levels help in assessing the impact of additional or
changed review processes.7 Second, studies of the causes and effects of dis-
covery disputes8 help in determining whether an added opportunity for re-
view is likely to lead to an even greater number of disputes9 and, therefore,
greater delay during the discovery process. Third, studies of the effects of
delay on courts and parties provide information about the importance of any
delay that interlocutory review might generate.' 0
The empirical data from the Texas courts and the information available
about other jurisdictions have nationwide implications. With the current
concern about discovery abuse, many jurisdictions are considering legisla-
tion that will greatly increase the discretion accorded the trial judge in dis-
covery matters. Such discretion creates tremendous potential for abuse, and
absent some kind of effective appeal mechanism the abuse will remain
largely unreviewable. Traditional hostility to interlocutory review, however,
will discourage legislators and courts from looking to interlocutory review as
6. In Texas, for example, statutory interlocutory appeals are limited to orders appointing
or refusing to get rid of a receiver or trustee, certifying or refusing to certify a class in a class
action, and orders granting or refusing a temporary injunction. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 51.014 (Vernon 1989). The court's use of mandamus powers is also limited.
See, e.g., Johnson v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 700 S.W.2d 916, 917 (Tex. 1985)(trial court's
grant of new trial not proper subject of mandamus order); Tenneco, Inc. v. Salyer, 739 S.W.2d
448, 449-50 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1987, orig. proc.) (mandamus unavailable to review
improper venue order); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Street, 761 S.W.2d 587, 589 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1988, orig. proc.)(no mandamus review of discovery sanctions).
7. E.g., T. CHURCH, A. CARLSON, J. LEE & T. TAN, JUSTICE DELAYED: THE PACE OF
LITIGATION IN URBAN TRIAL COURTS (1978); T. CHURCH, A. CARLSON, J. LEE, T. TAN &
V. MCCONNELL, PRETRIAL DELAY: A REVIEW AND BIBLIOGRAPHY (1978)[hereinafter
PRETRIAL DELAY] (a history of pretrial delay); P. CONNOLLY, E. HOLLEMAN & M. KUHL-
MAN, JUDICIAL CONTROLS AND THE CIVIL LITIGATIVE PROCESS: DISCOVERY (1978) (a
study of the impact of judicial controls on trial disposition times); B. MAHONEY, CHANGING
TIMES IN TRIAL COURTS (1988); J. MARTIN & E. PRESCOTT, APPELLATE COURT DELAY:
STRUCTURAL RESPONSES TO THE PROBLEMS OF VOLUME AND DELAY (1981)[hereinafter
MARTIN & PRESCOTT]; Connolly & Smith, The Litigant's Perspective on Delay: Waiting for
the Dough, 8 JUST. SYs. J. 66 (1983); Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We
Know and Don't Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious & Litigious
Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4 (1983) [hereinafter Galanter, Landscape]; Trubek, Sarat, Fel-
stiner, Kritzer & Grossman, The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72
(1983)[hereinafter Trubek, The Costs].
8. E.g., J. EBERSOLE & B. BURKE, DISCOVERY PROBLEMS IN CIVIL CASES (1980); Bra-
zil, Views from the Front Lines: Observations by Chicago Lawyers About the System of Civil
Discovery, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 219 [hereinafter Brazil, Front Lines]; Brazil, Civil
Discovery: Lawyers' Views of Its Effectiveness, Its Principal Problems and Abuses, 1980 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 789 [hereinafter Brazil, Lawyers' Views].
9. Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique and Proposals for
Change, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1295 (1978).




a solution to the discretion problem, unless they realize that the traditional
hostility is unfounded.
The Article concludes that interlocutory review of discovery orders is not
the demon that commentators fear. Rather, such review has a positive ef-
fect. Although review has increased appellate caseloads, the increase has
been an extremely small and manageable one."l Appellate review has caused
minimal delays in case disposition at the trial court level, if review caused
delay at all.1 2 Interlocutory review has a mixed effect on the parties. A
review process has the potential to favor defendants seeking delay,1 3 but the
data indicates that this is not a problem to date. 14 Rather, the process itself
appears to operate in a neutral fashion, and both plaintiffs and defendants
use it. In addition, the body of reported case law emerging from the review
process has clearly favored discovery. Emerging case law has also made in-
formation previously undiscoverable available to plaintiffs and other individ-
ual litigants.15 Finally, interlocutory review has shifted power from trial
judges to appellate judges, 16 evening out inconsistencies in trial court rul-
ings, and providing a body of case law on discovery that allows trial judges
to operate with a more accurate understanding of the meaning of the discov-
ery rules.
1 7
Interlocutory review of discovery orders has resulted in a more even-
handed right to review and a more evenhanded distribution of the informa-
tion relevant to the issues in civil cases. It has done so without significantly
burdening either the trial or appellate courts. This Article concludes with a
model for a system of discretionary interlocutory appeal that would allow
other jurisdictions to include review of discovery orders in their procedural
schemes in a way that would best balance the competing needs of fairness
and efficiency.
I. THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: BALANCING THE COSTS AND
BENEFITS OF INTERLOCUTORY REVIEW
Most court systems in the United States adhere to some version of the
final judgment rule: appeals are permitted only from "final decisions" of the
trial courts.' 8 Interlocutory orders must wait until the end of the entire case
before a court can review them. The original purposes behind the require-
ment of finality are uncertain, and the requirement may have reflected feudal
record keeping needs rather than any policy favoring finality.19 Today, how-
11. See infra text accompanying notes 77-100.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 101-20.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 121-24.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 125-65.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 166-87.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 188-89.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 189-228.
18. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982); Note, Toward a More Rational Final Judgment Rule: A
Proposal to Amend 28 U.S.C. § 1292, 67 GEO. L.J. 1025, 1026 (1979).




ever, the final judgment rule is well entrenched and is thought to be sup-
ported by a number of policy considerations.
Many of the reasons people give for opposing interlocutory review center
around efficiency concerns. The final judgment rule, it is said, conserves
judicial resources.20 If the procedural framework permitted the parties to
appeal every pretrial order entered by the trial court, the trial process would
be severely disrupted.21 Similarly, interlocutory appeals would burden the
appellate courts by: (1) increasing the sheer number of appeals; (2) forcing
the appellate courts to repeatedly familiarize themselves with the same cases;
(3) causing the appellate courts to view orders in isolation rather than in
light of the entire proceeding below; and (4) allowing appeals from rulings
that would otherwise become moot, either because the aggrieved party wins
the trial on the merits, because the order is harmless error, or because the
case settles before reaching the appellate courts.22 In short, some people
believe that interlocutory review is inefficient because it can increase appel-
late workloads and cause delay at the trial court level.
Commentators also oppose interlocutory review for reasons growing out
of concern for the litigants. 23 The availability of repeated appeals may allow
wealthy litigants to force opponents into unfavorable settlements simply by
making the cost of litigation unbearable. 24 Additionally, the delay caused by
the repeated appeals may increase the likelihood that evidence will disappear
and that witness memories will fade, thus prejudicing the party with the
burden of proof.
25
Finally, commentators oppose interlocutory review because of its effects
on the relative roles of trial and appellate courts.26 Easily available review,
they argue, risks destroying the morale of the trial court judges and lowering
public respect for trial courts. 27 Further, interlocutory review deprives the
system of the value of the trial judge's more direct contact with the parties
and issues. 28 Interlocutory review also decreases finality, which is itself an
important value in the judicial system.
29
Because of this longstanding hostility to interlocutory review, such review
is hard to come by, especially in the federal courts. Judges and commenta-
20. Note, Appealability in the Federal Courts, 75 HARV. L. REV. 351, 351-52 (1971).
21. Cooper, Timing As Jurisdiction: Federal Civil Appeals in Context, 47 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS., 157, 158 (Summer 1984); Note, supra note 18, at 1025.
22. Appellate Jurisdiction, supra note 3, at 220; Cooper, supra note 21, at 157-58; Note,
supra note 18, at 1025-26.
23. See infra notes 24-25.
24. 15A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3906, at 432 (1986) [hereinafter C. WRIGHT]; Redish, The Pragmatic Approach to Appeala-
bility in the Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 89, 100, 104 (1975); Note, supra note 18, at
1026.
25. C. WRIGHT, supra note 24, at 431; Note, supra note 18, at 1026.
26. See infra notes 27-29.
27. See Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate Courts, 41 MINN. L. REV. 751,
782 (1957).
28. Id; see also Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed from Above, 22
SYRACUSE L. REV. 635, 662-63 (1971); Note, supra note 18, at 1027-28.
29. Cooper, supra note 21, at 158.
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tors, reinforcing each others' views, tend to stress the dangers of immediate
review.30 In so doing, they also tend to view all types of interlocutory orders
together in one mega-category, rather than analyzing the costs and benefits
of reviewing each type of order.31 In deciding whether courts should permit
interlocutory review in specific cases, judges and commentators tend to em-
phasize the needs of court administration over the needs of the litigants. 32
Whatever the basis for the fears about interlocutory review, the theories
are based largely on untested assumptions. Accordingly, the time has come
to test the assumptions on which the limits on interlocutory review are
based. Furthermore, the time has come to examine the effect of review of
discovery orders in particular, rather than review of all pretrial orders. Does
interlocutory review of discovery orders cause significant delay in the appel-
late courts? In the trial courts? Is it used by wealthier litigants to harass
and pressure their opponents? How does it affect the relative roles of the
trial and appellate courts? In an attempt to answer these questions, I con-
ducted an empirical study of interlocutory review in Texas, a jurisdiction
that allows discretionary review of discovery orders. Before discussing the
results of the study, this Article will describe the operation of the Texas
system used as the basis for the study.
II. THE TEXAS SYSTEM: MANDAMUS REVIEW OF DISCOVERY ORDERS
A. When the Writ Is Available
1. Historical Development
A number of state33 and, to a lesser extent, federal courts34 allow occa-
30. See Lauro Lines S.R.L. v. Chasser, 109 S. Ct. 1976, 1980, 104 L. Ed. 2d 548, 556
(1989); Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 436 (1985); Appellate Jurisdiction,
supra note 3, at 351-52; Cooper, supra note 21, at 158.
31. Occasionally, commentators suggest that different types of orders should be treated
differently. See MACCRATE, APPELLATE JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 108. However, commenta-
tors have not conducted an empirical or theoretical analysis of any particular kind of interlocu-
tory order in isolation.
32. See Appellate Jurisdication, supra note 3, at 75-77 (recommending interlocutory re-
view of non-final orders only when there is substantial doubt about the controlling principle of
law and a prospect that substantial litigation cost or judicial energies may be saved by an early
decision on the matter by the court of appeals); Note, supra note 18, at 1039-40 (noting that
present version of 28 U.S.C. § 1292 focuses on the needs of the courts rather than the parties).
33. See R. STERN, APPELLATE PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES, at 79-101 (2d ed.
1989); Christian, Interlocutory Review in California - Practical Justice Unguided by Stan-
dards, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 111 (Summer 1984); Clifford, Civil Interlocutory Appel-
late Review in New Jersey, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PRODS. 87 (Summer 1984); Haddad, The
Common Law Writ of Certiorari in Florida, 29 U. FLA. L. REv. 207, 208 (1977); Klein-
schmidt, The Final Judgment Rule in Arizona, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 103 (Summer
1984); Korn, Civil Jurisdiction of the New York Court of Appeals and Appellate Divisions, 16
BUFFALO L. REv. 307, 310 (1967); Tuchler, Discretionary Interlocutory Review in Missouri:
Judicial Abuse of the Writ?, 40 Mo. L. REv. 577, 585 (1975); Wetherington, Appellate Review
of Final and Non-Final Orders in Florida Civil Cases - An Overview, 47 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 61 (Summer 1984); Whichard, Appealability in North Carolina: Common Law Defini-
tion of the Statutory Substantial Right Doctrine, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 123 (Summer
1984).
34. See Federal Civil Appellate Jurisdiction: An Interlocutory Restatement, 47 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 13 (Spring 1984); Note, supra note 18; Redish, supra note 24.
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sional review of pretrial orders, sometimes by appeal and sometimes by the
use of the extraordinary writs of mandamus, certiorari, or prohibition.
Texas, however, provides a unique opportunity for studying the effects of
interlocutory review of discovery orders because it allows review of discov-
ery orders through mandamus, while severely restricting review of most
other discretionary pretrial orders.3" Further, the mandamus procedure is
available to challenge both orders granting discovery and orders denying dis-
covery. 36 The system is also noteworthy because, although it ritualistically
claims to review discovery orders only for "clear abuse of discretion," it in
fact uses a more rigorous standard of review. 37 A look at the operation of
discovery mandamus, therefore, provides an opportunity to study the effect
of a system of readily-available discretionary review that does more than just
rubber-stamp the decisions of the trial court.
In order to understand the courts' use of mandamus to control the discre-
tion of trial courts in discovery matters, a look at the historical development
of the use of mandamus is helpful. Two doctrines had to be overcome before
mandamus became an effective means of reviewing discovery orders: the
requirement that the appellant have no adequate remedy at law, and the
"clear abuse of discretion" standard of review.
Traditionally, Texas courts restricted the use of the writ to cases where no
adequate remedy at law existed. 38 Texas courts, therefore, refused to use
mandamus to review orders that could be assigned as error in an appeal from
the final decision on the merits.39 Since the appellate court can review dis-
covery orders on appeal, at least in theory, this principle tended to preclude
the use of mandamus to review discovery orders.40 Eventually, however, the
courts found that appeal provided an inadequate remedy for persons im-
properly ordered to produce documents, because once the documents were
produced to opposing parties, the person's privilege or privacy right had
been violated and a reversal on appeal could not undo the revelation.
41
Next, the courts began to find an inadequate remedy on appeal even for
parties denied discovery. This practice began, apparently without anyone
raising the issue, in two 1977 cases in which the trial courts refused to let
35. See supra note 6.
36. Jampole v. Touchy, 673 S.W.2d 569, 573 (Tex. 1984) (products liability plaintiff
brought mandamus proceeding to compel judge to vacate order denying discovery requests).
37. See infra text accompanying notes 46-66.
38. State v. Sewell, 487 S.W.2d 716, 718 (Tex. 1972) (decree enjoining hearings vacated on
"clear abuse of discretion" grounds).
39. Aycock v. Clark, 94 Tex. 375, 376, 60 S.W. 665, 666 (1901) (mandamus action seek-
ing to compel trial judge to enter judgment).
40. Discovery orders are reviewable on appeal from the final judgment. See Equitable
Trust Co. v. Jackson, 129 Tex. 2, 3-4, 101 S.W.2d 552, 553 (1937) (discovery request review-
able after final judgment rendered); Morris v. Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n, 759 S.W.2d 14, 15
(Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, writ denied) (worker's compensation case involving review
of protective order on appeal).
41. Maresca v. Marks, 362 S.W.2d 299, 301 (Tex. 1962) (mandamus proceeding sought to
prevent discovery of income tax information which was immaterial to issue at hand); Crane v.
Tunks, 160 Tex. 182, 191-92, 328 S.W.2d 434, 440-41 (1959) (discovery of income tax returns).
1050 [Vol. 44
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plaintiffs discover crucial information.42 When squarely faced with the issue
in 1984, the supreme court held that parties denied discovery have no ade-
quate remedy by way of appeal, 43 because: (1) an appellate order, after a
long delay, entitling a party to go back to the trial court and begin again is
not a meaningful remedy;44 and (2) an appellant denied discovery may have
suffered real harm but be unable to demonstrate on appeal that the denial
was "harmful error."
'45
A second principle also discouraged the use of mandamus to review dis-
covery orders. The appellate courts originally used mandamus solely to re-
view the lower courts' performance of a ministerial function.46 This power,
however, soon expanded to allow review of trial court decisions that the
appellate court found to be "so gross an abuse of discretion.., as to amount
to a virtual refusal . . . to act at all in contemplation of law."' 47 Over the
years the application of this "abuse of discretion" standard came to allow
steadily increased supervision of the trial courts in their exercise of discre-
tionary decision making.48 Nowhere, however, has the court's use of man-
damus power over lower court discretion been more available than in cases
involving discovery orders.
The trend began with a case that merely ordered the trial court to exercise
its discretion, when it refused to inspect allegedly privileged documents in
camera prior to ordering their production. 49 The court later expanded the
writ power, however, using mandamus to reverse a trial court's decision
42. Allen v. Humphreys, 559 S.W.2d 798, 801 (Tex. 1977) (production of defendant's pre-
lawsuit studies of the causal connection between its actions and injuries like plaintiff's); Barker
v. Dunham, 551 S.W.2d 41, 42 (Tex. 1977) (discovery from an employee/expert).
43. Jampole, 673 S.W.2d at 576 (discoverability, in products liability case against car
manufacturer, of alternate fuel storage system designs known to defendant).
44. Id. at 576.
45. Id. at 576. The court found that an appeal from a final judgment could be of little use
to a plaintiff denied discovery:
The trial court's action in this case effectively prevents [the plaintiff] from
proving the material allegations of his lawsuit. On appeal, it is unlikely he
would be able to show that the trial court's errors were harmful .... Because
the evidence exempted from discovery would not appear in the record, the ap-
pellate courts would find it impossible to determine whether denying the discov-
ery was harmful .... Moreover, [even if harm could be shown,] requiring a
party to try his lawsuit, debilitated by the denial of proper discovery, only to
have that lawsuit rendered a certain nullity on appeal, falls well short of a rem-
edy by appeal that is "equally convenient, beneficial, and effective" as
mandamus.
Id.
46. See Arberry v. Beavers, 6 Tex. 457, 467 (1851) (refusing to issue writ of mandamus to
compel the chief judge of Cass County to tabulate the returns from every precinct in deciding
the outcome of an election choosing the county seat).
47. Id. at 472; see also King v. Guerra, 1 S.W.2d 373, 376-77 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1927, writ ref'd) (mandamus may be appropriate to correct an order that is purely
arbitrary or without reason).
48. See Womack v. Berry, 156 Tex. 44, 50-51, 291 S.W.2d 677, 682-83 (1956) (finding that
refusal to order separate trial amounted to clear abuse of discretion).
49. Crane v. Tunks, 160 Tex. 182, 187-88, 328 S.W.2d 434, 437-38 (1959) (mandamus
granted because trial court ordered production of plaintiff's 1950 tax return, despite plaintiff's
privacy claims, without first inspecting it to determine what portions were relevant to the suit).
1990] 1051
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about the relevance of certain documents.50 The court soon freely used
mandamus to decide various questions as to the appropriate scope of
discovery.
51
The Texas courts have moved from a system in which writs of mandamus
were comparatively unavailable to review discovery orders to a system in
which orders granting and denying discovery are immediately reviewable in
the friendly neighborhood court of appeals.52 Further, although courts con-
tinue to recite the "clear abuse of discretion" test, they in fact provide a real
review of the trial court's order.
2. Standard of Review
Appellate courts claim to issue writs of mandamus only when the trial
court "reaches a decision so arbitrary and unreasonable that it results in a
clear and prejudicial error of law."5 3 The actual decisions of the courts,
however, sometimes belie this oft-repeated statement.
Some of the courts' decisions, for example, involve a substitution of the
appellate court's exercise of discretion for that of the trial court. This is
particularly true when the issue is relevance or burdensomeness. Appellate
courts have granted writs of mandamus based on their assessment of the
relative burdens of deposition locations,54 the burden of producing informa-
tion in relation to its materiality,55 and the parties' privacy rights in relation
50. In Maresca v. Marks, 362 S.W.2d 299, 300 (Tex. 1962), the district judge examined
Maresca's tax returns, found them to be relevant in their entirety, and ordered production.
The supreme court examined the returns, concluded that the district judge had erred, and
ordered him to reverse his decision. Id. at 300-01.
51. In addition to these doctrinal changes expanding the availability of mandamus, a
change in the jurisdiction of the appellate courts made the use of mandamus procedures less
forbidding. Originally, only the supreme court had the authority to grant a writ of mandamus
against a district judge. In 1983, the legislature made the authority of the appellate courts
virtually coextensive with that of the supreme court, giving both courts the power to issue a
writ of mandamus "agreeable to the principles of law regulating those writs" against a district
judge. TEX. GOVT. CODE ANN. §§ 22.002(a), 22.221(b) (Vernon 1988). One article suggests
that this change provided attorneys with a less intimidating and less costly avenue of appeal in
the local intermediate appellate court, thus increasing the number of applications for writs.
Ray & McKelvey, The Mandamus Explosion, 28 S. TEX. L. REV. 413, 415-16 (1987). The
supreme court also rewrote the rules of procedure to require a party seeking mandamus relief
first to present its request to the court of appeals in those cases when both courts have manda-
mus authority. TEX. R. APP. P. 121(a)(1) (formerly TEX. R. Civ. P. 474); Ray & McKelvey,
The Mandamus Explosion, 28 S. TEX. L. REV. 413, 415-16 (1987).
52. For a more thorough discussion of the historical evolution of the writ of mandamus in
Texas, see Novell & Sutton, The Original Writ of Mandamus in the Supreme Court of Texas, 1
ST. MARY'S L.J. 177, 178-79 (1969); Comment, The Expanding Use of Mandamus to Review
Texas District Court Discovery Orders: An Immediate Appeal is Available, 32 Sw. L.J. 1283,
1291 (1979); Note, The Use of Mandamus to Review Discovery Orders in Texas: An Extraordi-
nary Remedy, 1 REV. OF LITIG. 325, 326 (1981).
53. Flores v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 777 S.W.2d 38, 41 (Tex. 1989) (citing Johnson v.
Fourth Court of Appeals, 700 S.W.2d 916, 917 (Tex. 1985)).
54. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Street, 754 S.W.2d 153, 155 (Tex. 1988) (CEO's deposition
should be taken in Arkansas rather than Texas); Dresser Indus. v. Solito, 668 S.W.2d 893, 895-
96 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, orig. proc.) (plaintiff must find alternative to de-
posing seven overseas witnesses in Houston at defendant's expense).
55. Jampole, 673 S.W.2d at 576 (discoverability of model years and types of cars different
from plaintiff's); Enos v. Baker, 751 S.W.2d 946, 950 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988,
1052 [Vol. 44
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to materiality. 56 In each of these cases, the appellate court appeared to make
its decision about discoverability based on its own assessment of the facts
rather than deferring to the decision of the trial court.
The appellate courts have also substituted their analysis for that of the
trial court in areas involving the standards used for trial court fact-finding.
For example, in order to determine the starting point of work product and
other discovery privileges, the court must determine when the party assert-
ing the privilege began to act "in anticipation of the prosecution or defense
of the claims made in the pending litigation."' 57 This dispute involves both
issues of fact and issues of the correct standard to apply in deciding those
facts. In mandamus reviews of the trial courts' decisions, the courts of ap-
peal have differed dramatically in the amount of deference given to the trial
court's decision. 58
A number of discovery mandamus cases set out or interpret the rules gov-
erning the scope of discovery, particularly the scope of the various exemp-
tions from discovery. In these cases the court's emphasis is not on the trial
court's exercise of discretion. Rather, the appellate courts primarily set out
and interpret various rules concerning discovery. For example, the appellate
courts have used discovery mandamus cases to: (1) establish the parameters
of the privilege for hospital committee documents;59 (2) discuss the discover-
ability of the defendant's net worth when the plaintiff seeks punitive dam-
orig. proc.) (divorce of two lawyers, mandamus granted of trial court's order to husband to
produce all active client files of his law firm and all demands made on behalf of clients, for wife
to use in evaluating the value of the firm as community property).
56. See Walsh v. Ferguson, 712 S.W.2d 885, 886-87 (Tex. App.-Austin 1986, orig. proc.)
(in child custody dispute where wife claimed that husband used drugs, mandamus granted of
order directing husband to furnish blood and urine samples); Velasco v. Haberman, 700
S.W.2d 729, 730 (Tex. App.-Austin 1985, orig. proc.) (in a divorce case, mandamus granted
of order limiting wife's attorney to five questions regarding husband's adultery at deposition of
husband).
57. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(3).
58. See, e.g., Flores v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 777 S.W.2d at 42 (trial court within
discretion granting discovery order); Stringer v. Eleventh Court of Appeals, 720 S.W.2d 801,
802 (Tex. 1986) (appellate court granted mandamus against trial court, supreme court held
appellate court abused its discretion); Foster v. Heard, 757 S.W.2d 464, 465 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, orig. proc.) (appellate court found abuse of discretion); H.E. Butt
Grocery Co. v. Williams, 751 S.W.2d 554, 557 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1988, orig. proc.)
(trial court abused its discretion in discovery order); Phelps Dodge Ref. Corp. v. Marsh, 733
S.W.2d 359, 361 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1987, orig. proc.) (trial court correct in allowing discov-
ery in wrongful death claim); Texaco Ref. & Mktg., Inc. v. Sanderson, 739 S.W.2d 493, 494
(Tex. App.-Beaumont 1987, orig. proc.) (appellate court found no abuse of discretion in trial
court's denial of discovery); Service Lloyds Ins. Co. v. Clark, 714 S.W.2d 437, 438 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1986, orig. proc.) (no abuse of trial court discretion in ordering discovery of
insurance claim file).
59. Barnes v. Whittington, 751 S.W.2d 493, 496 (Tex. 1988) (hospital documents pre-
pared by or at the direction of hospital committee are privileged); Jordan v. Court of Appeals
for Fourth Supreme Judicial Dist., 701 S.W.2d 644, 645 (Tex. 1985) (same); Doctor's Hosp. v.
West, 765 S.W.2d 812, 814 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, orig. proc.) (same); Santa




ages; 60 (3) clarify the discoverability of photographs;61 (4) explain the
conditions required to overcome a reporter's privilege; 62 and (5) reinforce
the rules governing discovery from expert witnesses.
63
Some cases do take a more deferential approach to the trial court, either
finding the trial court's order to be within the realm of permissible deci-
sions, 64 or merely issuing the writ in cases where the trial court failed to
exercise its discretion.65 In short, the Texas system, all by itself, demon-
strates the truth of Judge Friendly's comment that "[tjhere are a half dozen
different definitions of 'abuse of discretion,' ranging from ones that would
require the appellate court to come close to finding that the trial court had
taken leave of its senses to others which differ from the definition of error by
only the slightest nuance."
'66
B. The Procedure Used to Seek Mandamus
A party seeking mandamus relief files a motion and petition in the appel-
late court, along with a small deposit for costs.67 The court may or may not
request that the respondent (in discovery cases, this will be the trial judge or
60. Lunsford v. Morris, 746 S.W.2d 471, 472, (Tex. 1988) (defendant's ability to pay the
punitive damages directly related to question of punishment and deterence); Miller v. O'Neill,
775 S.W.2d 56, 58-59 (Tex. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1989, orig. proc.) (rejecting bifurcation
to delay discovery); Hanna v. Meurer, 769 S.W.2d 680, 681 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989, orig.
proc.) (en banc) (discovery of financial information not a per se invasion of privacy).
61. Terry v. Lawrence, 700 S.W.2d 912, 913 (Tex. 1985) (photographs not entitled to
protection from discovery under TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(3)); Axelson, Inc. v. McIlhany, 755
S.W.2d 170, 173 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1988, orig. proc.) (photos not reflecting "mental im-
pressions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney" not Within work product exemption from
discovery).
62. Channel Two Television Co. v. Dickerson, 725 S.W.2d 470, 471-72 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, orig. proc.) (person seeking disclosure of documents protected by
reporter's privilege must show high degree of materiality and relevancy, necessity to claim, and
only source of information).
63. Lindsey v. O'Neill, 689 S.W.2d 400, 402 (Tex. 1985) (mental impressions/opinions of
experts not exempt from discovery when not acquired or developed in anticipation of litiga-
tion); Jones & Laughlin Steel, Inc. v. Schattman, 667 S.W.2d 352, 355 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1984, orig. proc.) (trial judge has discretion regarding designation of expert witnesses).
64. Flores, 777 S.W.2d at 41; C-Tran Dev. Corp. v. Chambers, 772 S.W.2d 294, 296 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, orig. proc.) (refusing to find abuse of discretion in relevance
issue); W.W. Rodgers & Sons Produce Co. v. Johnson, 673 S.W.2d 291, 293 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1984, orig. proc.).
65. See, e.g., Ryals v. Canales, 767 S.W.2d 226, 230 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, orig. proc.)
(judge should have inspected allegedly privileged documents in camera); State Farm Ins. Co. v.
Salinas, 767 S.W.2d 212, 214 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1989, orig. proc.) (trial court should
have heard evidence or conducted in camera inspection); Goodspeed v. Street, 747 S.W.2d 526,
529-30 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1988, orig. proc.) (judge who ruled without hearing testimony
or examining documents ordered to hold hearing); Shell Western E & P, Inc. v. Oliver, 751
S.W.2d 195, 196-97 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, orig. proc.) (trial court should have conducted
in camera inspection).
66. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747, 763 (1982).
67. TEX. R. App. P. 13, 121. The mandamus record is fairly simple, consisting of a peti-
tion, certified copies of the order complained of and other relevant documents, and authorities
supporting the petition. A transcript of the proceedings in the trial court is necessary if the
propriety of the order under attack depends upon facts adduced at a hearing. TEX. R. App. P.
121. See also W. DORSANEO, 6 TEXAS LrrIGATION GUIDE § 150A.51 (1989) (providing a
more detailed description of the proper procedure for seeking mandamus).
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the court of appeals) or the real party in interest (the party who won the
discovery fight in the trial court) submit a reply.68 The court either makes a
preliminary determination that the party seeking mandamus is entitled to
the relief sought and places the case on the docket or overrules the motion
without opinion.
69
A party unsatisfied with the court of appeals' action in a mandamus pro-
ceeding may seek further review. The judgment of a court of appeals in an
original mandamus action may not be appealed to the supreme court.70 If
the court of appeals denies the writ, however, the relator (the party seeking
mandamus) may try again in the supreme court. If the court of appeals
grants the writ, the party who originally won in the trial court (acting
through the trial judge) may challenge the grant as an abuse of discretion in
an original mandamus action brought in the supreme court.71
In summary, the Texas courts permit interlocutory review of discovery
orders. The current system uses an extraordinary writ to achieve review.
Thus, the grant of review is discretionary with the appellate court. Review
does not, however, require the prior approval of the trial judge. Texas courts
openly acknowledge the availability of mandamus review of orders granting
and denying discovery. In addition, a writ of mandamus is the only existing
method of obtaining interlocutory review of such orders. 72 This Article ex-
amines this system in operation to see what effect it has on court administra-
tion, on the parties, and on the role of the courts.
III. EFFECT OF INTERLOCUTORY REVIEW OF DISCOVERY ORDERS ON
COURT ADMINISTRATION
In the last decade, commentators have expressed a great deal of concern
about increasing caseloads and delays at both the trial and appellate court
levels.73 Substantial opposition arises, therefore, to any innovation that has
the potential to increase caseloads, and this opposition is not unfounded. At
the appellate level, for example, the addition of numerous new appeals may
have systemic costs, whether they cause slow turnaround time in all cases or
result in procedures that decrease the amount of judicial attention given to
each case.74 At the trial level, an increased number of contested pretrial
matters may lengthen the period of time before a case is tried or settled.
75
68. TEX. R. App. P. 121(c).
69. Id.
70. Scurry v. Friberg, 119 Tex. 463, 463, 32 S.W.2d 637,637 (1930).
71. See Johnson v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 700 S.W.2d 916, 917 (Tex. 1985) (discretion
exercised by appellate court in a mandamus proceeding is more confined than that of a trial
court).
72. Texas courts have not used contempt orders as a means of achieving review of discov-
ery rulings, nor does Texas have a discretionary appeal provision that parallels 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b) (1988).
73. See PRETRIAL DELAY, supra note 7; MARTIN & PRESCOTT, supra note 7.
74. Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to the Function
of Review and the National Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 542, 554-56 (1969); Cooper, supra note 21,
at 159.
75. Cf Trubek, The Costs, supra note 7, at 104 (increased strategic interaction increases
the amount of time spent on a case).
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Existing empirical data,76 however, does not support an argument that inter-
locutory review of discovery orders causes either of these problems.
A. Appellate Courts
Undoubtedly, the number of cases in the appellate courts has increased.
A study by the National Center for State Courts concluded that the number
of appeals nationwide had doubled between 1950 and 1975, and that in
many intermediate appellate courts the number of appeals had tripled.
77
Similarly, surveys in 1985 showed that the number of appeals, in twenty-five
out of the forty-two states for which figures were available, increased more
than 100% between 1973 and 1983.78
Interlocutory review of discovery orders, to the extent that it was not
available before, would likely add to this caseload. Although some discovery
orders were appealable with a final judgment, as a practical matter many
were not appealed. First, the party aggrieved by the order may have won at
trial, and therefore, would not appeal a discovery order. Second, the case
may have settled before trial or appeal, so there would be no appeal of a
discovery order. Third, even if the party aggrieved by the discovery order
lost the case at trial and appealed, only an unusual discovery order would be
dispositive enough to show the harmful error that most jurisdictions require
for appellate reversal. 79 Many appellants, therefore, would not even raise
the discovery points on appeal. A procedure that allows immediate review
of discovery orders is likely to bring new cases to the courts of appeals.
Nevertheless availability of review would not necessarily increase appel-
late court delay or workload significantly. A recent study of appellate court
delay concluded that caseload is not the most important factor in determin-
ing the speed at which appellate courts dispose of their cases. 80 In the appel-
76. Although growing, the body of empirical work on caseload delay has its limitations.
The existence of interactive variables and insufficient data bases have made empirical studies
very difficult. Luskin, Building a Theory of Case Processing Time, 62 JUDICATURE 114, 116
(1978). Varying conditions in different jurisdictions and the passage of time also make general-
izations difficult. Daniels, Ladders and Bushes: The Problem of Caseloads and Studying Court
Activities Over Time, 1984 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 751, 752 (1984). Also, ethical constraints
on empirical studies make it difficult to structure experiments that can single out a limited
number of variables to assess the impact of particular changes in court procedures. E. A.
Lind, J.E. Shapard & J.S. Cecil, Methods for Empirical Evaluation of Innovations in the Justice
System, in EXPERIMENTATION IN THE LAW: REPORT OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON EXPERIMENTATION IN THE LAW, Appendix B (1981).
77. S. WASBY, T. MARVELL & A. AIKMAN, VOLUME AND DELAY IN STATE APPELLATE
COURTS 13-16 (1979) (the study counted the number of opinions issued by state courts without
discretionary jurisdiction).
78. T. Marvell, Is There An Appeal from the Caseload Delay?, 24 JUDGES J. 34, 36 (Sum-
mer 1985); Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin, 1973-83 Trends: The Growth of Appeals 3
(Feb. 1985).
79. This is particularly true when the discovery order denied discovery and the appellant
is in the position of trying to show the appellate court that the absence of information caused a
different result at trial, particularly when the absent information is not in the record. See
Morris v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 759 S.W.2d 14, 15 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988,
writ denied) (court abused discretion in denying discovery of claim file, but denial not shown
to be harmful error).
80. MARTIN & PRESCOTT, supra note 7, at xviii.
1056 [Vol. 44
INTERLOCUTORY REVIEW
late courts studied, courts with larger caseloads took no longer or only
slightly longer to process their cases than did courts with smaller
caseloads.8 1 Further, courts with more filings per judge were sometimes ap-
preciably faster than courts with relatively fewer cases per judge.8 2 The
study concluded that delay or backlog in a given court is a "function of the
complex interplay of volume, decision-making efficiency, and managerial
style."'8 3 Possibly, therefore, a modest increase in appellate court caseload, if
coupled with effective case management techniques, would cause no signifi-
cant decrease in the quality or speed of appellate justice.
The available numbers confirm that review of discovery orders, where
available, is a minor part of the appellate caseload. In New York, for exam-
ple, where virtually every pretrial order is appealable as a matter of right,
one study of 300 appellate cases found that only 9 (3%) involved discovery
orders. 84 Similarly, analysts of the Arizona85 and California 6 systems con-
cluded that interlocutory review of pretrial orders generally has not bur-
81. Id.
82. Id. In Texas, for example, the Dallas court of appeals, with 116 new filings per judge
in fiscal 1988, and the Texarkana court of appeals, with only 36 new filings per judge, each
averaged 8.1 months from filing to disposition. TEXAS OFFICE OF COURT ADMINISTRATION,
TEXAS JUDICIAL SYSTEM ANNUAL REPORT at 177-79 (1988) [hereinafter JUDICIAL REPORT].
The data for all the intermediate appellate courts is as follows:
Filings per Judge Disposition Time (Filing to Disposition)
(lowest to highest) (fastest to slowest)
Texarkana 35 2/3 Eastland 6.6 months
Eastland 72 2/3 Tyler 7 months
Amarillo 77 1/2 Corpus Christi 7.2 months
Ft. Worth 79 4/7 El Paso 7.6 months
Waco 82 1/3 Beaumont 7.8 months
Corpus Christi 92 2/3 Dallas 8.1 months
San Antonio 92 6/7 Texarkana 8.1 months
Austin 92 6/7 Amarillo 8.2 months
El Paso 96 1/2 Waco 8.2 months
Beaumont 105 Houston [1st] 8.3 months
Tyler 107 Houston [14th] 8.7 months
Dallas 116 San Antonio 9.1 months
Houston[14th] 120 Ft. Worth 9.5 months
Houston [1st] 131 Austin 10 months
83. MARTIN & PRESCOTT, supra note 7, at.
84. Project, The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York- An Empirical
Study of its Powers and Functions as an Intermediate State Court, 47 FORDHAM L. REV. 929,
987, 1019 (1979) [hereinafter Project, Appellate Division]. In seven of the nine cases (77.8%),
the discovery order was affirmed, and in two of the cases (22.2%) the order was reversed.
Another review of the New York system noted that overall, appellate courts reversed or modi-
fied 36% of intermediate orders appealed, versus only 21% of final orders. MACCRATE, AP-
PELLATE JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 89.
85. Kleinschmidt, The Final Judgment Rule in Arizona, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
103, 105-09 (Summer 1984). Arizona allows discretionary review of discovery rulings by a
"special action" proceeding that replaced the old extraordinary writs of certiorari, mandamus,
and prohibition. Id. at 108.
86. Christian, Interlocutory Review in California-Practical Justice Unguided by Stan-
dards, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 111, 111-17 (Summer 1984). While California nominally
has a restricted and formal procedure for certified and interlocutory appeals, in practice pre-




dened the appellate courts. 87
In Texas, where the status of discovery orders permits a more fine-tuned
empirical analysis, one can also see that interlocutory review of discovery
orders has not created an important burden on the appellate courts. A 1981
study concluded that "applications for writs of mandamus to review discov-
ery orders have not inundated the supreme court."88 In 1979, for example,
parties filed with the supreme court 933 applications for review.89 Of these,
only twenty-four (2.6%) 90 sought writs to review discovery orders. 91 In
1980, parties filed 943 applications, and only twenty-three (2.4%) sought
review of discovery orders. 92 In 1981, of the 943 applications filed with the
court, only seventeen (1.8%) sought writs to review discovery orders. 93 The
numbers appear to have increased slightly. In the year ending August 31,
1989, the supreme court disposed of only fifty-one requests for mandamus
involving discovery orders. 94 Only five of these cases resulted in published
87. Kleinschmidt, supra note 85, at 110; Christian, supra note 86, at 120-21.
88. Note, supra note 52, at 339. Until 1983, the Texas Supreme Court was the only court
in the state with mandamus power over the district courts, so these statistics represent the total
number of mandamus actions for all courts in the state.
89. Id.
90. Id. These percentages actually overstate the proportional time spent on discovery
mandamus, because the total number of applications filed does not include motions, which also
occupy a significant portion of the court's time. In fiscal 1988, for example, in addition to the
997 applications for writ of error filed, the court also had to deal with the 769 other writs and
motions filed. JUDICIAL REPORT, supra note 82, at 152 (the motions are primarily motions for
rehearing).
91. Note, supra note 52, at 339. These statistics are taken from the Supreme Court, Cen-
tral Staff, 1979-80 Statistics, and from the 1981 Texas Supreme Court Journal. These numbers
are slightly lower than those reported by the Texas Judicial System Annual Report, because
the latter counts multiple motions within a single application as separate items. Id. at 339 n.
105. One hundred and twenty-nine of the 933 applications requested writs of mandamus, but
only 24 sought writs to review discovery orders. Id. at 339.
92. Id. One hundred and sixteen of the 943 applications requested writs of mandamus.
Id.
93. Id. Nintey-eight of the 943 applications sought writs of mandamus. Id. In 1983, the
Texas Office of Court Administration (TOCA) switched from keeping calendar year statistics
to keeping statistics based on a September 1 to August 31 fiscal year. Although the TOCA
does not count discovery mandamus actions separately from other mandamus actions, the
numbers on mandamus actions generally indicate that they have held fairly steady or increased
modestly over the years, except for a large increase in fiscal year 1988.
Time Period Mandamus Actions Filed
Jan. 1 - Dec. 31, 1977 88
Jan. 1 - Dec. 31, 1978 123
Jan. 1 - Dec. 31, 1979 137
Jan. 1 -Dec. 31, 1980 130
Jan. 1 - Dec. 31, 1981 96
Jan. 1 - Dec. 31, 1982 132
Jan. 1 - Dec. 31, 1983 142
Sep. 1, 1983 - Aug. 31, 1984 113
Sep. 1, 1984 - Aug. 31, 1985 135
Sep. 1, 1985 - Aug. 31, 1986 143
Sep. 1, 1986 -Aug. 31, 1987 141
Sep. 1, 1987 - Aug. 31, 1988 194
TEXAS OFFICE OF COURT ADMINISTRATION, ANNUAL REPORTS, 1977 -1988.




Statewide numbers for mandamus cases are not available for intermediate
appellate courts. A study of cases in the Dallas court of appeals for January,
1988 through June, 1989, however, shows that discovery mandamus cases
are also a fairly small percentage of that court's workload. 96 In fiscal 1988,
for example, litigants filed 1508 new cases, or an average of 126 cases per
month, in the Dallas appellate court. Of these 126 cases per month, approxi-
mately two per month were applications for mandamus review of discovery
orders. Thus, about 1.5% of the court's caseload consisted of interlocutory
review of discovery orders.97
During the eighteen month period from January, 1988 through June,
1989, the Dallas court of appeals disposed of a total of thirty-four motions
for leave to file petitions for writ of mandamus raising discovery issues. Of
those thirty-four cases, the court denied leave to file in twenty-two, granted
leave to file but denied the writ in six, and granted the writ in six. Assuming
that the cases in which leave to file is denied require comparatively less judi-
cial time,98 only twelve cases, or about one case every six weeks, required
significant amounts of judicial attention.
The numbers, then, suggest that while the availability of interlocutory re-
view of discovery orders added cases to the appellate docket, interlocutory
review has not added a large or burdensome number of cases. 99 While trial
courts enter many discovery orders, litigants take few to the courts of ap-
peals. Many orders are correct. Even as to the arguably erroneous orders,
many litigants presumably will balance an attempted interlocutory appeal
against the harm endured while waiting for a final judgment, concluding that
the trial court's order simply does not warrant the costs and trouble of an
author) [hereinafter Tabulation]. Since the court's overall caseload has also increased, manda-
mus cases remain a tiny percentage of total caseload.
95. Id.
96. One would expect that if any intermediate appellate court in Texas had a high number
of discovery mandamus cases, it would be the Dallas court. The Dallas court of appeals has
the largest caseload of any of the 14 intermediate appellate courts in Texas. In fiscal 1988, for
example, 1508 new cases were filed in the Dallas court of appeals, versus 1181 in the next
busiest court. The Dallas court of appeals receives approximately 19% of all cases filed in the
state. JUDICIAL REPORT, supra note 82.
97. Id. (statistical data on file with author).
98. This assumption is supported by the turnaround time data. In the thirty-four cases
for which time data is available, the court of appeals disposed of twenty less than a week after
filing, three less than two weeks after filing, and five less than three weeks after filing. In other
words, the court disposed of 82% of the discovery mandamus cases in less than three weeks,
and the cases that took longer were the cases in which the court granted review. Id.
99. Despite the comparatively small number of discovery mandamus cases, appellate
judges evidently consider the procedure to have created a problem. One Texas Supreme Court
Justice wrote of the mandamus "explosion." Ray & McKelvey, supra note 51, at 413. Other
appellate judges have complained to the State Bar Section on Appellate Practice. See Letter
from Chair, Section of Appellate Practice and Advocacy, to Committee Chairs (Aug. 21, 1989)
[hereinafter Letter from Chair] (copy on file with author) (noting complaints about mandamus
from three court of appeals justices). Those trying to explain the burdensome nature of man-
damus review mention its emergency or surprise nature. Id. This characterization appears to
refer to the rhythm of work on mandamus cases rather than to any kind of quantitative analy-
sis of the additional increment of work caused by mandamus review.
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attempted interlocutory appeal. 100
B. Trial Courts
The limited data available at the trial court level indicates that delay
caused by mandamus review is not a significant problem there, either. As in
the case of appellate courts, well-grounded concern exists about delay. In
theory, interlocutory review of discovery orders could delay the trial court
during the review process itself or prolong the discovery period so that cases
take longer to get to trial. 101 While this theory is not inherently implausible,
the existing empirical research tends to show that the burden would not be
severe.
Studies indicate that discovery is not a major factor in pretrial delay in
most cases. 102 To the extent that delay exists, the discovery process is not
the major cause of delay, especially in ordinary lawsuits. A number of stud-
ies concluded that in the typical lawsuit, pretrial activity is modest and rela-
tively little discovery occurs. 103
A 1978 study of 1649 cases in state and federal trial courts found that
"[r]arely did the records reveal more than five separate discovery events." 1° 4
A Federal Judicial Center study found that 51.7% of the 3,114 cases studied
had no discovery requests, and that another 20.6% had two or fewer re-
quests.10 5 In 95.1% of the cases ten or fewer discovery requests existed. 1o6
An American Bar Foundation study, based on interviews with 180 Chicago
area attorneys in the summer of 1979, concluded that in smaller cases dis-
covery plays a relatively minor role, the use of discovery tools is straightfor-
ward, and disputes are less common. 10 7 If the normal case has little
discovery activity and fewer discovery disputes, the availability of interlocu-
tory review of discovery orders is unlikely to affect either these cases or the
dockets of courts handling primarily such cases.
Further, empirical studies attribute the majority of pretrial delay to fac-
tors other than the discovery process.'0 8 The Columbia Project for Effective
Justice, working in the 1960s, decided after interviewing a number of trial
100. Redish, supra note 24, at 104 n.86.
101. Appellate Jurisdiction, supra note 3, at 220.
102. See infra text accompanying notes 104-20.
103. See infra text accompanying notes 104-07.
104. Trubek, The Costs, supra note 7, at 90. The study also found that lawyers devoted an
average time of only 16.7% to discovery. Id. at 91. This study took a random sample (1649
cases in all) of civil cases from five federal judicial districts, including federal district courts
and at least one state court in each district. Id. at 80-82. The study excluded cases where the
initial claim was for less than $1,000, and 37 "megacases." Id. at 80-81.
105. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee to Study the High Cost of Litigation to the Seventh
Circuit Judicial Committee and the Bar Association of the Seventh Federal Circuit, 86 F.R.D.
267, 275 n.5 (1979) (citing CONNOLLY, JUDICIAL CONTROLS, infra note 106, at 29).
106. P. CONNOLLY, E. HOLLEMAN & M. KUHLMAN, JUDICIAL CONTROLS AND THE
CIVIL LITIGATIVE PROCESS: DISCOVERY 28 (1978) [hereinafter CONNOLLY, JUDICIAL CON-
TROLS]. The data base for this study was all recorded discovery information for approximately
500 terminated cases in each of six federal district courts (3,114 cases in all) that terminated
during the 1975 fiscal year. Id. at 27-28.
107. Brazil, Front Lines, supra note 8, at 223.
108. See infra text accompanying notes 109-12.
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lawyers that discovery activity did not cause most individual case delay. 109
A recent study of trial court delay noted that improved court management
techniques, especially early trial judge involvement, accelerated the discov-
ery process, but that long delays still existed between completion of discov-
ery and trial.110 An earlier Federal Judicial Center study likewise conceded
that speeding up discovery would not speed up case disposition unless the
court could set a quick and realistic trial date.I1 ' Thus, unless the manda-
mus process delays the trial date, as opposed to prolonging slightly the dis-
covery period itself, the process will not contribute to increased delays in the
trial court. 1 2
Empirical data from the Texas courts supports the notion that the manda-
mus process does not cause major delays in case disposition.'1 3 First, the
information available indicates that even in reported cases, which are apt to
take longer than cases involving no written opinion, the mandamus process
caused minimal delay. Of the fifty-nine reported cases from 1983 to June of
1989 in which disposition dates are mentioned, the appellate court disposed
of 41% of the mandamus petitions in less than three months from the date of
the trial court order, 55% in less than four months from the date of the trial
court order, and 77% in less than six months from the date of the trial court
order." 4 Courts, then, dispose of most reported mandamus cases within a
time frame that would allow trial at the time prescribed by the Texas Rules
of Judicial Administration: within eighteen months of the answer date for
civil jury cases, and within twelve months for civil nonjury cases.'
109. PRETRIAL DELAY, supra note 7, at 27 (citing W. GLASER, PRETRIAL DISCOVERY
AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 217 (1968)).
110. B. MAHONEY, A. AIKMAN, P. CASEY, V. FLANGO, G. GALLAS, T. HENDERSON, J.
ITO, D. STEELMAN, S. WELLER, CHANGING TIMES IN TRIAL COURTS 178 (1988) [hereinafter
MAHONEY]; see also Brazil, Front Lines, supra note 8, at 223-27 (small cases with routine
discovery disposed of slowly primarily because of extreme delay in availability of trial date).
111. CONNOLLY, JUDICIAL CONTROLS, supra note 106, at 75.
112. If delay in enforcement of a discovery order delayed settlement, then a prolonged
discovery period would in and of itself delay the disposition of a case. Studies, though, indi-
cate that the prospect of impending trial, rather than other factors, tends to precipitate settle-
ment. Also, to the extent that completion of discovery is the event triggering a trial setting, a
longer period of discovery can delay case disposition. In many jurisdictions, however, a trial
setting will not, as a practical matter, be available until a time that allows generous leeway for
the completion of discovery, even allowing for brief interruptions for interlocutory review of
discovery orders. A jurisdiction in which firm trial dates were available at a time immediately
following the amount of time needed for the speediest possible discovery would have more
cause to worry about the interruptions caused by interlocutory review of discovery orders. I
have seen no studies of any such jurisdiction.
113. This section of the Article discusses delay from the standpoint of the courts, and
therefore looks only at the impact of delay on case processing. The next section looks at delay
from a different perspective, that of the litigants. Delay is a more serious problem when
viewed from the litigants' perspective, and can impact the litigants unequally. See infra text
accompanying notes 121-24.
114. These time periods may include delay by the parties in seeking the writ, since they run
from the date of the trial court order to the date of the appellate court opinion. Time data
from the Dallas court of appeals, which runs from the date of filing in the court of appeals to
the disposition of the case in the court of appeals, shows much shorter turnaround times.
115. TEXAS SUPREME COURT, RULES OF JUDICIAL ADMIN., Rule 6(b) (1987). In fact,
Texas courts do not try many cases as quickly as these standards would indicate. In Dallas
County, for example, in fiscal year 1988, the district courts disposed of 47,844 civil cases. Of
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Unreported mandamus cases involve even less delay than the reported
ones. Figures from the Dallas court of appeals from 1988 to mid-1989 show
the following turnaround times from fling in the court of appeals until the
court of appeals' ruling in the case:
Time Number of Cases







Many of the dispositions within a week of filing occurred on the same day
that the case was filed. If the Dallas appellate court is typical, then, the total
turnaround time involved in a promptly-mandamused discovery order may
be no more than a few weeks and may be as little as a day.
Also, the effect of the pendency of a mandamus proceeding in the court of
appeals on the trial court remains unclear. Interlocutory review does not
create an automatic stay of the trial court order under review. 11 6 Even if the
appellate court stays that particular order, other discovery in the case need
not stop unless the disputed information is so central to the litigation as to
make further discovery without it wasteful. In many cases, other proceed-
ings in the trial court may carry on normally while the court of appeals
considers the disputed order.
Even if the mandamus proceedings disrupt a particular case, the process
most likely does not burden the trial court generally. During the period
from January, 1988 to June, 1989, no judge subject to the jurisdiction of the
Dallas court of appeals1 17 was the subject of more than four mandamus pro-
ceedings. Most had one mandamus proceeding or less pending. 18 This
modest discovery mandamus activity came at a time when those trial courts
had more than 35,000 civil cases pending.' 19 During fiscal 1988, those trial
these cases, 21% had been pending for three months or less, 28% had been pending more than
three months but less than six months, 26% had been pending more than six months but less
than 12 months, 11% had been pending more than 12 months but less than 18 months, and
14% (6,698 cases) had been pending for more than 18 months.
Statewide, "[O]f all civil cases disposed, 28% were by non-jury trials. (Approximately 63%
of these non-jury trials were in divorce cases). Of the civil cases disposed, 19.5% were family
law (show cause) dispositions." Thus, the total sample includes a number of essentially uncon-
tested cases or those in which the turnaround time is very short. JUDICIAL REPORT, supra
note 82, at 186.
116. TEX. R. ApP. P. 121(d) (allowing petitioner to request temporary relief).
117. The Dallas court of appeals handles matters originating in Collin, Dallas, Grayson,
Hunt, Kaufman, Rockwall, and Van Zandt Counties. JUDICIAL REPORT, supra note 82, at 13.
118. The trial court judges within the jurisdiction of the Dallas court of appeals were rarely
involved in mandamus actions. During the study period, 14 trial judges had one mandamus
proceeding pending, six judges had two mandamus proceedings pending, two judges had three
mandamus proceedings pending, and one judge had four mandamus proceedings pending.
Many judges were involved in no mandamus proceedings at all.
119. JUDICIAL REPORT, supra note 82, at 190.
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courts disposed of more than 48,000 cases.1 20 Viewed in context, the discov-
ery mandamus activity insignificantly effected overall trial court delay.
Despite theorists predictions, the availability of interlocutory review of
discovery orders causes only a minor impact on court administration at the
appellate and trial court levels. At the appellate level, review added a very
modest number of cases that tended, in the past, not to reach the court of
appeals. These cases represent a tiny percentage of the total appellate
caseload. At the trial level, with current court congestion, the availability of
mandamus review has an insignificant effect on pretrial delay. Although de-
lay may occur, in that the order being reviewed may be stayed during the
pendency of review, insufficient information exists to demonstrate that these
delays lead to delays in case disposition. Further, other pretrial activity in
the case can continue during the pendency of the mandamus proceeding. In
addition, the practical impact on the trial courts as a whole is small because
rarely do parties to a lawsuit seek mandamus review of a discovery order.
IV. EFFECT OF INTERLOCUTORY REVIEW OF DISCOVERY ORDERS ON
THE PARTIES
While the effect of interlocutory review on the courts appears to be minor,
the review process might seriously impact the litigants. The system there-
fore must be examined to determine its effect on the parties.
Interlocutory review of discovery orders presents many theoretical
problems for litigants. The availability of review may increase the number of
discovery disputes. 121 In addition, wealthy litigants may use the review pro-
cess to achieve delay, which tends to favor defendants, especially corporate
defendants, and to harm plaintiffs, especially individual plaintiffs. 122 In ad-
dition to delay, a wealthier litigant could use an added review procedure to
increase the workload and economic pressure on a poorer litigant. The cost
of the review process tends to favor wealthier litigants by increasing cost
barriers to acquiring information through discovery. 123 Finally, the in-
creased complexity of the discovery procedures, when interlocutory review is
added to the trial court rules, tends to favor those who can afford more
sophisticated, and generally more expensive, lawyers.
124
120. Id. at 364.
121. Cf. Brazil, Lawyers' Views, supra note 8, at 852 (lawyers' use of discovery disputes to
achieve delay). This can be a particular problem in a big lawsuit with large institutional liti-
gants on both sides. Such cases, however, are rare. Trubek, The Costs, supra note 7, at 80-81
(only 37 "megacases" out of a random sample of 1649 cases).
122. Id. at 853-57.
123. Brazil, Front Lines, supra note 8, at 225 (expense of discovery relative to case value
sometimes deterred discovery); Galanter, Landscape, supra note 7, at 45-46 ("enlarged right of
appeal... is a source of counters and strategems [that] can be used effectively only by [those
litigants with sufficient resources]").
124. Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 LAW & Soc'y REV. 95, 98, 114-19 (1974) (repeat player advantages for those regu-
larly involved in litigation); Graham, The Persistence of Progressive Proceduralism, 61 TEX. L.
REV. 929, 939 (1983) ("increasing [procedural] complexity... makes it much more likely that




Existing empirical data supports some of these fears, but not all of them.
First, the mere existence of a review procedure is unlikely to increase the
number of discovery disputes. A study by the Federal Judicial Center
sought to identify the characteristics that tended to lead to discovery dis-
putes; the causes they discovered centered around the nature of the parties
and the lawyers rather than on available discovery procedures.1 25 The exist-
ence of interlocutory review, in and of itself, would not change these charac-
teristics and, therefore, would not increase the number of discovery disputes.
The study did, however, find that certain wealth-related factors influenced
the tendency of a given case to produce discovery disputes. The study found
both resistance to discovery and overdiscovery greater in cases where the
economic strength of the parties substantially differed.1 26 The lawyers in-
volved also possessed certain significant characteristics: lawyers who spe-
cialized in an area, particularly the defense of certain kinds of claims, tended
to see themselves as specialists who knew what was supposed to be done,
facing non-specialist plaintiff's lawyers who didn't. This perspective in-
creased the tendency of the defense lawyers to resist the plaintiff's discovery
requests. 127 Relative law firm size was also important. Discovery problems
surfaced more often when a lawyer from a very small firm (less than ten
lawyers) faced a lawyer from a large firm. 128 Since in many cases wealthier
parties have greater access to these specialist or larger law firms, they will
tend to engage in more discovery disputes. Finally, the study found that
more discovery problems existed in cases in which lawyer access to client
decision makers was limited, such as cases involving insurance compa-
nies. 129 This data supports a fear that in cases where discovery disputes
frequently occur, a wealthier litigant may also be able to make strategic use
of interlocutory review procedures.
One strategic use would be review brought only for purpose of delay.
Studies have found a differential effect of delay on plaintiffs and defendants,
as well as significant differences between plaintiffs and defendants in the de-
liberate use of delay. One analysis of pretrial delay concluded that "[p]arties
to a lawsuit do not suffer equally from delay. In fact.., civil.., defendants
may have considerable [advantage] to gain from protracted court process-
ing."1 30 Defendants can benefit from delay both by postponing the necessity
to pay the plaintiff and by increasing the chances that the passage of time
will impair the quality of evidence and make it more difficult for the plaintiff
to meet her burden of proof.131 Another study also found that pretrial delay
125. J. EBERSOLE & B. BURKE, supra note 8, at 50-61, 69-71.
126. Id. at 50.
127. Id. at 54.
128. Id. at 57.
129. Id. at 59-60. Out of 124 reported Texas discovery mandamus cases, 21 involved insur-
ance companies as named parties to the litigation and 38 more apparently involved litigants
protected by insurance. Often, these disputes centered around the discoverability of the insur-
ance company's investigative files. Almost half (47.6%) of the reported discovery mandamus
cases involved insurance companies. Id.
130. PRETRIAL DELAY, supra note 7, at 12.
131. Id. at 12-13.
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had a greater negative effect on plaintiffs than on defendants. 132 Plaintiffs
tended to suffer financially during the pendency of a lawsuit, while defend-
ants did not. 133 Further, increased delay tended to increase stress in plain-
tiffs but not in defendants.
1 34
Perhaps because of this unequal effect of delay, researchers have found
that defense lawyers have a greater tendency to use the discovery process for
tactical purposes. Brazil's study of 176 Chicago area attorneys found that
"defense counsel are more likely than plaintiffs' lawyers to use discovery
tools for purposes of delay."' 35 Brazil found a parallel difference between
lawyers who tended to represent individuals and those who tended to repre-
sent corporate clients. Lawyers who devoted most of their time to represent-
ing individuals reported that delay had motivated their use of discovery in
approximately 26% of their cases in the five years preceding the survey,
while lawyers who devoted most of their time to corporate clients reported
that delay motivated their use of discovery 46% of the time. 136 To the ex-
tent that interlocutory review of discovery orders can bring about delay,
then, one may expect defendants and institutional litigants to use review to
achieve delay.
In addition to delay, wealthier litigants can benefit from increased costs
generated by discovery disputes. One lawyer interviewed in the Brazil study
noted that "discovery gives incredible leverage to parties and firms with big
resources" and said that he would "use this power to penalize opponents"
whenever he could.' 37 When interlocutory review increases costs,138 wealth-
ier litigants can use it to deter their opponents from effective discovery. The
more attorney time needed to acquire information through discovery, the
more expensive the information becomes. Thus, not surprisingly, the Civil
Litigation Research Project found that when defendants' lawyers force
plaintiffs' attorneys to spend an above average amount of time on discovery,
the ratio of recovery to fees decreases, and the plaintiff receives less benefit
from the litigation.' 3
9
Interlocutory review can also benefit wealthier litigants, or at least liti-
gants with better lawyers, to the extent that it introduces greater complexity
into the lawsuit. "As the process becomes more complex, increasingly it can
be used effectively only by players who can deploy the resources to play on
the requisite scale."' 40 Increasing complexity, then, has not only dollar cost,
but also a cost in accuracy of outcome when the parties have lawyers of
unequal abilities. Procedural complexity can mean that the relative skills of
the lawyers rather than the merits of the case will determine the case's out--
132. Connolly & Smith, supra note 7, at 276-77.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 277.
135. Brazil, Lawyers' Views, supra note 8, at 853.
136. Brazil, Front Lines, supra note 8, at 232.
137. Brazil, Lawyers' Views, supra note 8, at 857.
138. Trubek, The Costs, supra note 7, at 112-19.
139. Id. at 114-16.
140. Galanter, Landscape, supra note 7, at 45-46.
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come. 141 If wealthier litigants have more resources to hire lawyers from the
more prestigious segments of the legal community (and if these more expen-
sive and prestigious lawyers are better able to cope with complex legal is-
sues), these wealthier litigants will have a comparative advantage in an
interlocutory review process.142
The theory and information available about discovery, then, can lead us to
fear that an interlocutory review process would benefit wealthier litigants. 1
43
The Texas data, which focuses specifically on interlocutory review of discov-
ery orders, indicates that the process provides no significant advantages or
disadvantages. 144 Since no data shows the comparative wealth of the parties
in most cases, no direct analysis of the effect of wealth is available. I have,
therefore, used two factors as surrogates for a wealth-based analysis. First, I
compared the effects of the mandamus process on plaintiffs and defendants.
Second, I compared the effects of the mandamus process on individuals and
on institutional litigants, especially in cases where the party on one side of a
lawsuit is an individual and the party on the other side is an institution. For
purposes of this Article, the term "institutional litigant" includes business
organizations such as corporations as well as government entities. Also,
those who are nominally individuals but who are, in fact, represented by
insurance companies count as institutional litigants.
First, as noted above, the data which I have examined indicates that delay
has not caused a significant problem in most discovery mandamus cases. In
the Dallas court of appeals, the court disposed of all of the mandamus pro-
ceedings within four months of filing, and disposed of 82% within three
weeks. Even looking at reported mandamus cases, which are apt to take the
longest, the court disposed of forty-one of the fifty-six cases for which time
data is available within six months of the date of the trial court order. Of the
fifteen cases that took at least six months to resolve, seven cases went to both
the court of appeals and the supreme court, thus lengthening the time re-
quired for disposition.
A review of the substance of the discovery disputes involved in the re-
ported and unreported cases reveal few, if any, that could be considered friv-
141. Graham, supra note 124, at 939.
142. Galanter, supra note 124, at 114-19.
143. See supra text accompanying notes 121-42.
144. While an interlocutory review process provides one more forum for a discovery dis-
pute, it does not itself create the opportunity for a dispute. Thus, those who suggest decreasing
the volume of mandamus cases by changing the scope of discovery or eliminating certain privi-
leges are more likely to be successful than those who suggest tinkering with certification proce-
dures or sanctions. In reported cases in Texas, for example, the subject matter of the disputes
leading to discovery mandamus was as follows:





Eliminating certain discovery exemptions, such as ordinary work product, would dramatically
decrease the volume of discovery disputes arising out of these exemptions and, therefore, the
volume of interlocutory review.
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olous. No clear pattern emerges from the cases that either side uses
mandamus solely to delay the litigation.
Insofar as the unsuccessful use of mandamus by a party who lost in the
trial court may indicate that the party used mandamus for harassment or
delay, the numbers show a somewhat greater tendency on the part of defend-
ants and institutional litigants to use mandamus and lose. In reported cases,
defendants lost in the trial court, sought mandamus, and lost in thirty-six
cases. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, lost in the trial court, sought manda-
mus, and lost in only fourteen cases. Viewed from a perspective of individ-
ual versus institutional litigants, institutional litigants lost in the trial court,
sought mandamus, and lost in twenty-five cases, while individuals did the
same in only ten cases. The Dallas court of appeals statistics are somewhat
more equal. Defendants lost in the trial court and unsuccessfully sought
mandamus sixteen times, while plaintiffs did so eleven times. Institutional
litigants lost in the trial court and unsuccessfully sought mandamus eight
times, while individual litigants did so six times.
Second, the actual costs involved in a discovery mandamus proceeding
tend to be small in most cases. The filing fee is only fifty dollars in the court
of appeals.145 The cost of the record also tends to be small, since the court
of appeals often needs only copies of the relevant discovery documents and
court order. Even where the court of appeals requires a transcript of a hear-
ing, the transcript is apt to be short and inexpensive as compared to a nor-
mal appellate record. The cost of briefing can also be comparatively low.
The parties will already have done much of the research needed for the man-
damus review in connection with the primary discovery dispute in the trial
court. Further, mandamus briefs are not subject to many of the technical
rules governing formal appellate briefs.146 Finally, courts dispose of many
mandamus cases on the relator's motion alone shortly after filing, so the
party opposing mandamus incurs no additional costs for research or briefing.
Third, while mandamus procedures introduce a new level of complexity
into the litigation process, no evidence suggests that the process tends to
favor one side or the other. The procedures themselves are not particularly
complicated, 147 and the resulting case law is available in neatly packaged
continuing education programs throughout the state to lawyers from all ar-
eas of practice and at all levels of competence.
148
Nor do the cases reflect a pattern of one-sided defendant success. If any-
thing, the process results in more plaintiff victories. For example, out of 124
145. TEX. R. App. P. 13 (c), 121 (a)(5).
146. Compare TEX. R. App. P. 121(a)(2) (requiring "a brief of authorities and argument")
with TEX. R. App. P. 74, 131, 136 (requisites of briefs in normal appeals).
147. See supra text accompanying notes 67-72.
148. E.g., STATE BAR OF TEXAS, DISCOVERY (1990); Dorsaneo, Discovery Developments:
Scope, Privileges and Presentation of Objections, SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIVERSITY SCHOOL
OF LAW, ADVANCED CIVIL TRIAL SHORT COURSE B-1 through B-56 (1989); Orsinger, Suc-
cessful Mandamus Approaches in Discovery, in STATE BAR OF TEXAS, ADVANCED EVIDENCE
AND DISCOVERY L-1 through L-45 (1988); Keltner, Mandamus, STATE BAR OF TEXAS, AD-
VANCED CIVIL TRIAL COURSE F-1 through F-31 (1989).
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reported cases 149 from 1983 through mid-1989, the plaintiffs gained im-
proved results in thirty-five of the cases while defendants received improved
results in thirty-two cases. 150 The even-handedness of the results also ap-
pears when the statistics are broken down to show who won in the trial
court:' 51















Defendants won in fifty-six cases while plaintiffs won in seventy-one cases.
If, instead of comparing plaintiffs and defendants, one looks at cases in-
volving individual parties litigating against institutional parties, the pattern
is similar:















The institutions, then, won in thirty-one cases, while the individuals won in
fifty-three cases. 152
Reported and unreported cases from the Dallas court of appeals are some-
what more pro-defendant. For example, out of thirty-four cases, plaintiffs
did better in one case, defendants did better in six cases, and the court of
appeals' sustained the trial court in twenty-seven cases. Of the twenty-seven
cases in which the court of appeals upheld the trial court ruling, plaintiffs
sought mandamus in twelve cases and defendants in twenty-two. The break-
downs, including trial court success data, also parallel reported cases:















149. In this and all subsequent statistics regarding outcomes in reported cases in the appel-
late courts, I have used the following counting conventions:
1. When both a court of appeals and the Supreme Court of Texas issued opin-
ions in the same case, I have counted only the supreme court opinion.
2. In family law cases that do not specify otherwise, I have counted the wife as
the plaintiff.
3. Cases involving more than one party seeking mandamus on different grounds
are counted as separate cases.
150. In 48 of the cases, the appellate court upheld trial court's decision, and in these cases
the plaintiff sought mandamus on 15 occasions while the defendant sought mandamus on 33
occasions. The appellate court sent 16 other cases back to the trial court to handle miscellane-
ous procedural problems.
151. The following chart omits seven cases that involved third parties rather than conflicts
between plaintiffs and defendants.



















The plaintiff, in short, won in seventeen cases and the defendant won in
seventeen cases. When the data is analyzed along individual/institutional
lines the results are similar:
Won in Trial Court Used Mandamus Won in Ct.App. Number Wins
Individual Institution Institution 3
Individual Institution Individual 8
Institution Individual Individual I
Institution Individual Institution 6
To summarize, individuals won in nine cases and institutional litigants won
in nine cases.
153
Although plaintiffs have a greater tendency to win mandamus cases on the
merits, the data shows that defendants tend to use the mandamus process
somewhat more often. In reported cases, 154 plaintiffs sought mandamus in
forty-nine cases and while defendants sought mandamus in sixty-eight cases.
In the Dallas court of appeals, plaintiffs sought mandamus in twelve cases
and defendants sought mandamus in twenty-two cases. In reported cases,
individual litigants sought mandamus in fifty-one cases and institutional liti-
gants sought mandamus in seventy cases. Furthermore, in the Dallas court
of appeals, individual litigants sought mandamus in fifteen cases and institu-
tional litigants sought mandamus in eighteen cases. Defendants and institu-
tional litigants, therefore, have a slightly greater tendency to seek
mandamus.
Perhaps this indicates that defendants and institutional litigants analyze
"success" in mandamus cases in a way that does not equate success with a
favorable decision on the merits. When the mandamus process causes desir-
able delay, defendants may consider the process alone successful so long as it
does not result in an order allowing greater discovery by the plaintiff or in-
creased fees and costs merely to reaffirm a defendant victory in the trial
court. Viewed from this perspective, defendants may regard themselves as
successful in sixty-eight of the reported mandamus cases, while they see
plaintiffs as successful in only forty-nine of the cases.155 If additional fees
and costs are considered an insignificant burden compared to the advantage
of delay, defendants may regard themselves as successful in eighty-two of the
cases, while they see plaintiffs as successful in only thirty-five of the cases. 156
From this "success equals delay" perspective, institutions may regard them-
selves as having succeeded in forty-six cases versus thirty-eight successes for
individuals. If the value of delay outweighs costs, institutions may perceive
themselves as having succeeded in fifty-six cases with individuals succeeding
in only twenty-eight cases. This kind of analysis puts a heavy emphasis on
the value of very modest delays.157 The success equals delay perspective
153. There were eight cases in which individuals sued individuals and seven cases in which
institutions sued institutions.
154. These numbers exclude cases involving third parties.
155. See supra chart following note 151 in text.
156. Id.




may, however, explain the tendency of defendants to use the mandamus pro-
cess despite their tendency to lose on the merits and create pro-plaintiff case
law. On the other hand, defendants or their lawyers may have incorrectly
analyzed their ability to succeed on the merits.
In examining the effect of mandamus on the parties, one other phenome-
non is noteworthy: the vast majority of the reported cases involve the plain-
tiff's discovery from the defendant, or an individual litigant's discovery from
an institution, and not vice versa. For example, litigants disputed plaintiff's
discovery from defendant in ninety-eight reported cases, while only sixteen
cases involved defendant's discovery from plaintiff. 15 Similarly, litigants
disputed an individual's discovery from an institution in sixty-six reported
cases, while only thirteen cases involved an institution's discovery from an
individual. 159 In reported and unreported cases in the supreme court in fis-
cal 1989, the parties disputed plaintiff's discovery from defendants in twenty-
seven cases, but disputed defendant's discovery from plaintiff in eighteen
cases. 160
Assuming that plaintiffs and individuals are the parties with the least re-
sources and the least power outside the judicial system, these numbers reflect
controversies concerning the extent to which the judicial system will even
the odds by transferring information from the more powerful parties to the
less powerful parties. Those with established power in society tend, in many
cases, to appear in court as defendants.161 With the existing burden of proof
most often on plaintiffs, defendants can increase their chances of winning by
keeping their adversaries from getting evidence. Defendants are also less
likely to find themselves in a position of having to extract evidence from
opponents to prove any affirmative defenses. 162 When interlocutory review
results in greater information being available to plaintiffs, then, that review
may benefit plaintiffs not only in the discovery process itself, but also in the
outcome of the litigation.
The results of the cases indicate that overall, courts have acted to uphold
or increase the transfer of information. Out of 117 reported cases in which
the appellate court found the trial court's order to be reviewable by manda-
mus, 1 63 the appellate court concluded that in thirty-three cases the trial
158. Discovery from non-parties was in dispute in thirteen cases.
159. An individual's discovery from another individual was in dispute in 14 cases, while an
institution's discovery from another institution was in dispute in 24 cases. Cumulatively
speaking, discovery from an institution was at issue in 90 cases, while discovery from an indi-
vidual was at issue in only 27 cases.
160. See Tabulation, supra note 94.
161. 23 C.A. WRIGHT & K.W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 5422, at 674 (1980) [hereinafter WRIGHT & GRAHAM].
162. Id. Even when an institutional litigant appears as a plaintiff suing an individual de-
fendant as, for example, when a corporation sues an individual on a debt, the institutional
litigant tends to already have the information needed to prove its case. Contrast this with the
situation of an individual injured by a defective product who needs to discover extensive infor-
mation about the way in which the product was designed, manufactured, and distributed in
order to prove her case.




court had mistakenly denied discovery, and in thirty-six cases the trial court
had correctly granted discovery.164 In contrast, there were only twenty-
seven cases in which the appellate court concluded that the trial court had
mistakenly granted discovery, and twelve cases in which the trial court had
correctly denied discovery.' 65 Plaintiffs ended up with greater discovery
than the trial court had granted, or discovery equal to that granted by the
trial court, in fifty-nine cases, and with less discovery than the trial court had
granted in twenty cases. Defendants, on the other hand, ended up with
greater or equal discovery in ten cases, and with less discovery in seven
cases. These numbers do not reflect a system which unduly favors
defendants.
The won/lost records in individual mandamus cases show a tendency of
the results to favor the plaintiffs. In addition, the reported case law resulting
from interlocutory review of discovery orders benefits plaintiffs generally. 1
66
Before the advent of discovery mandamus, Texas had very few reported
cases regarding discovery issues, and the operation of the discovery process
was within the almost completely unfettered discretion of the trial judge.'
67
The resulting atmosphere was very hostile to discovery. Young attorneys
were advised that they could safely throw away opposing counsel's first dis-
covery requests.
Older reported cases concerning sanctions reflect the lengths to which par-
ties had to go to secure discovery. In one case, for example, the court or-
dered a party to produce documents on October third.168 He produced some
but not all of the documents on October thirteenth. On November third,
opposing counsel served interrogatories seeking to discover whether the un-
produced documents were within the party's possession, custody, or control.
The party failed to answer these interrogatories, so opposing counsel moved
for dismissal and obtained, on December fourteenth, a court order to compel
answers within ten days. 169 The party still did not answer, and the court
held a hearing on January eighth. At this hearing, the court ordered the
party to answer the interrogatories by January fifteenth, and the party did
so.' 70 The party did not, however, produce the remaining documents. On
164. Of these 36 cases, 31 granted discovery to plaintiff and five granted discovery to
defendant.
165. Of these 12 cases, 10 denied discovery sought by plaintiffs and two denied discovery
sought by defendants. There were also 9 cases in which the appellate court sent the matter
back to the trial court for further proceedings, holding that the trial court had ruled with
inadequate information.
166. I am certainly aware that such case law is not the inevitable result of an interlocutory
review process. See Tuchler, Discretionary Interlocutory Review in Missouri: Judicial Abuse of
the Writ?, 40 Mo. L. REV. 577, 615 (1975). However, the possibility that pro-discovery case
law will result from a review process must be considered in analyzing its effect on the parties.
Since the process itself appears to be largely neutral, it may indeed be the nature of the result-
ing case law rather than the existence vel non of interlocutory review that determines who is
hurt or helped by the review process.
167. Id. at 613.






March ninth, the trial court held a hearing on opposing counsel's second
motion to dismiss, and again declined to dismiss the suit. Instead, the court
ordered the party to produce the documents by March twenty-third.
1 71
Again, the party produced some but not all of the documents and the court
finally imposed discovery sanctions approximately six months after the first
court-ordered discovery.
172
The cases generated by the mandamus process changed the old system in a
number of ways. First, the cases broadened the scope of discovery relevance.
Second, the cases upheld individual privileges while narrowing institutional
privileges. In doing so, the cases also stressed the need for in camera inspec-
tion, shifting power to the trial judge and away from the institutional defend-
ant claiming the privilege.173 Third, the cases created procedures making
the claiming of privilege much more burdensome. Fourth, the cases put
teeth into the discovery deadlines, thus combatting resistance-type discovery
abuse.
As in the federal system, the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure define rele-
vance so as to permit discovery of information that "appears reasonably cal-
culated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence."' 174 In applying this
test, the courts have balanced the probative value of the information sought
and the burden on the party seeking discovery against the burden on the
party from whom discovery is sought. 175 In doing this balancing, the dis-
covery mandamus cases tend to give very little weight to the burden on de-
fendants of producing voluminous information. 176 The cases also give little
weight to defendants' desire for confidentiality, limiting protective orders to
disclosure of current information to competitors and encouraging discovery
171. Id. at 115.
172. Id. at 117-18; see also Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 242-
43 (Tex. 1985) (party ignored numerous deposition notices before sanctions granted); Jarrett v.
Warhola, 695 S.W.2d 8, 10 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd) (party repeat-
edly failed to respond in a timely manner to discovery requests, but numerous motions for
compliance were required before court orders were entered, and two court orders were defied
before court ordered sanctions).
173. See Peeples v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 701 S.W.2d 635, 637 (Tex. 1985) (trial court
should determine whether in camera inspection is necessary). As Professor Graham has
noted:
[iun a society with egalitarian pretensions, the creation and justification of a priv-
ilege to refuse to respond to a judicial inquiry is essentially a political question;
i.e., it is an allocation of power as between the various components of the soci-
ety. At one level it involves the power of the judge against the power of the
witness, and this allocation can have ramifications in terms of the power rela-
tionships of the litigants who depend upon the court for the enforcement of their
rights.
WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 161, at 673-74 (footnotes omitted).
174. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(2)(a).
175. Independent Insulating Glass/Southwest, Inc. v. Street, 722 S.W.2d 798, 803 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth 1987, orig. proc.).
176. See, e.g., Jampole v. Touchy, 673 S.W.2d 569 (Tex. 1984) (allowing discovery of all
impact tests for 1967-79 on a variety of General Motors passenger cars in a case involving a
1976 Vega hatchback); General Motors Corp. v. Lawrence, 651 S.W.2d 732 (Tex. 1983) (al-
lowing discovery of test results relating to in-cab gas tanks with protruding cab filler necks




sharing among plaintiffs' lawyers. 177
The mandamus-generated cases also changed privilege law in a way that
favors individuals. One commentator distinguishes between those privileges,
such as marital privileges, that protect interpersonal relationships or per-
sonal privacy, and those privileges, such as the attorney-client privilege or
the party communications privilege, that institutions typically assert.17 8 The
law emerging from mandamus cases in Texas protects individual privileges
while limiting those of institutions. For example, cases arising out of inter-
locutory review drastically narrowed the scope of work product, party com-
munication, and expert witness privileges.' 79 The cases also shortened the
duration of work product protection by holding that protection ends when
the lawsuit ends.' 80
In cases involving individually-held privileges, on the other hand, the
courts have provided more protection. For example, the supreme court re-
jected defendants' arguments that any plaintiff request for damages for emo-
tional distress should subject the plaintiff to a court-ordered psychiatric
examination.' 8 ' The courts have resisted ordering physical examinations
over an individual's objection without very strong showings of good
cause. 182
177. See Garcia v. Peeples, 734 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. 1987).
178. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 161, at 687. Professor Graham also notes that in
most states the allocation of exemptions tends to follow the distribution of political power.
Therefore, powerful institutions such as churches, government, corporations, and professions
that primarily serve a monied clientele (doctors, lawyers, psychiatrists) are given privileges to
preserve their secrets and those of their clients. Professions and institutions that serve analo-
gous functions for working class people are denied such protection. For example, compare the
treatment privilege law would afford to communications with tax lawyers to identical commu-
nications to a tax preparer from H&R Block. Id. at 675.
179. See cases cited supra note 58 and accompanying text. Under earlier Texas law, any
communications made or information learned in the course of investigating a claim was privi-
leged and undiscoverable. See Ex parte Hanlon, 406 S.W.2d 204 (Tex. 1966) (claims manager
discovered the name of hit-and-run driver during course of investigation; investigative privilege
prevented disclosure of name).
180. Dewitt & Rearick, Inc. v. Ferguson, 699 S.W.2d 692, 694 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1985,
orig. proc.). Work product protection may end even earlier than completion of the action. See
Insurance Co. of North America v. Downey, 765 S.W.2d 555, 557-58 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1989, orig. proc.) (severance of bad faith claim from contract claim made work
product discoverable in bad faith claim). For defendants involved in multiple related lawsuits,
this may mean that a Texas plaintiff can discover all non-privileged work product, including
material such as trial notebooks, data bases, and litigation support systems from related but
closed cases. Because the Texas courts encourage discovery sharing among plaintiffs' lawyers,
they may then be able to share information with other plaintiffs' lawyers in other related cases.
See Garcia v. Peeples, 734 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. 1987).
181. Coates v. Whittington, 758 S.W.2d 749, 751-53 (Tex. 1988). A court of appeals has
also ruled that when a physical or psychiatric examination is appropriate, the court may
choose a neutral physician rather than the physician desired by defendants. Employers Mut.
Casualty Co. v. Street, 702 S.W.2d 779, 780 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986), reh'g denied, 707
S.W.2d 277 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, orig. proc.).
182. See Manuel v. Spector, 712 S.W.2d 219, 223 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, orig.
proc.) (overturning court-ordered blood test of child's grandmother in paternity case); Walsh
v. Ferguson, 712 S.W.2d 885, 887 (Tex. App.-Austin 1986, orig. proc.) (overturning court-
ordered blood and urine tests in child custody case). In part, these cases are more solicitous of
individual privacy because they involve physical or mental examinations, and the discovering
party must show good cause rather than simple relevance in order to justify discovery. TEX.
1990] 1073
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
Even where privileges exist, the mandamus cases have made claiming the
privilege more burdensome. The appellate courts put the burden on a party
asserting a privilege to specifically plead the privilege, request a hearing, and
then produce evidence at the hearing to substantiate the privilege claim.183
Failure to follow these procedures resulted in a waiver of the privilege.'8 4
The discovery cases also made the assertion of privilege more difficult, and
made the time deadlines in the discovery rules a reality, by finding that late
responses waived the privilege.' 85 Courts have thereby severely circum-
scribed a party's ability to prolong the discovery process by simply ignoring
deadlines. Statistics indicate that defendants more often than plaintiffs com-
mit this kind of discovery abuse.1 6 Cases requiring enforcement of the
deadlines will, therefore, tend more often to benefit the plaintiffs.
In summary, interlocutory review does have an effect on the parties to the
litigation, but its effect depends more on the actual outcome of the cases and
the resulting case law than it does on the existence of the process itself. The
Texas experience shows a procedure which is relatively neutral: (1) review
is available of both denials and grants of discovery; (2) the review procedure
takes relatively little time; (3) the review procedure is relatively inexpensive;
and (4) the review procedure introduces few new procedural complications
into the litigation. A different state with a different history of discovery in
the trial courts, or a different attitude toward discovery in the appellate
courts, might well produce a system that benefits defendants or institutional
litigants. From an outcome perspective, the Texas experience is fairly even-
handed, but overall it has tended to benefit plaintiffs and individual litigants,
both in the outcome of specific cases, and in the generation of pro-discovery
case law.1
87
V. EFFECT OF INTERLOCUTORY REVIEW OF DISCOVERY ORDERS ON
THE ROLE OF THE COURTS
In section III, this Article examined the effect of interlocutory review on
R. Civ. P. 167a(a); cf. Kentucky Fried Chicken Nat'l Management Co. v. Tennant, 782
S.W.2d 318, 321 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, orig. proc.) (plaintiffs' psychiatric
records discoverable because relevant to their damage claims).
183. Peeples v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 701 S.W.2d 635, 637 (Tex. 1985) (procedures to
preserve privilege required). These requirements have since been incorporated into the discov-
ery rules, but the objecting party no longer has the burden of requesting a hearing. TEX. R.
Civ. P. 166b(4).
184. Thus, for example, in Weisel Enter., Inc. v. Curry, 718 S.W.2d 56, 58 (Tex. 1986), the
court held that a summary listing of documents under the heading "Attorney-Client/Attorney
Work-Product" constituted no evidence that any particular document was privileged. Rather
than remand the case to the trial court to hear more evidence on the privilege issue, the court
held that the privilege had been waived. Id. at 58-59.
185. Villarreal v. Dominguez, 745 S.W.2d 570, 571 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, orig.
proc.) (defendant city waived privilege as to police reports by failing to timely assert privilege);
Independent Insulating Glass/Southwest Inc. v. Street, 722 S.W.2d 798, 802 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1987, orig. proc.) (failure of manufacturer to file objections regarding discovery re-
quests waived rights to protective orders).
186. J. EBERSOLE & B. BURKE, supra note 8, at 45-46.
187. Cooper, supra note 21, at 159-63. A jurisdiction can adopt a neutral system by follow-
ing the model set out infra in the text accompanying notes 229-47.
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court administration, particularly on factors such as caseloads and case
processing time. This section addresses a different problem: the effect of
interlocutory review on the relationship between trial and appellate courts.
Appellate courts' ability to review the decisions of the trial courts, whether
while the case is pending or following a final decision in the case, is a ques-
tion of the allocation of power within the judicial system.188 When a single
trial judge can render a decision that is effectively final, judicial power is
concentrated at the trial level.18 9 When, on the other hand, the law empow-
ers appellate courts to review the trial judge's decision, the judicial power
shifts to the appellate courts.190 Since appellate courts tend to act in panels
of more than one judge, the shift to appellate review also tends to diffuse the
decisionmaking power from a single decisionmaker to multiple deci-
sionmakers. Increased availability of interlocutory review, therefore, would
result in a shift in judicial power from trial to appellate judges. Commenta-
tors disagree about whether such a shift is desirable.
Some oppose any trend toward greater appellate review, finding that its
costs outweigh its benefits.1 91 Those opposed to increased review identify
the costs as: (1) increased caseloads in the appellate courts; (2) increased
expense and delay for the litigants; 192 (3) decreased public confidence in trial
judges and decreased morale among trial judges; (4) loss of the advantage of
the trial court's direct involvement with the parties; and (5) decreased defer-
ence to finality as a value in the judicial system. 193
Professor Wright fears that increased availability of review impairs the
confidence of litigants and the public in the decisions of the trial courts.
94
The existence of review, after all, sends a signal to litigants and to society as
a whole that we do not fully trust the decisions of the trial court. Others,
however, note that appellate affirmation actually enhances the trial court's
authority and credibility. 195 To the extent that appellate courts reverse trial
court decisions, if the decisions were in fact incorrect, 196 then the system
balances competing values. Many maintain that deference to the feelings
188. See Friendly, supra note 66, at 755-56.
189. Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 840, 860 (1984).
190. Id. at 865.
191. Resnik contends that the legitimacy of a system in which a single judge renders a final
decision must rest on one (or more) of five assumptions: (1) trial judges tend to render "cor-
rect" or acceptable decisions, so that additional decisionmaking is unnecessary; (2) additional
decisionmaking would not significantly improve the quality of the first decisions, so that the
costs of increasing the number of decisionmakers outweigh its benefits; (3) procedures in the
trial courts are sufficient to express society's concern about individuals and their disputes; (4)
increasing the number of decisionmakers does not provide a better process by which to value
individuals and their disputes; or (5) individuals and their disputes are not worth valuing more.
Id. at 860.
192. For a discussion on the lack of empirical support for these assertions, see supra notes
76-119 and accompanying text. This section of the article will discuss the remaining problems
raised by judicial review.
193. See Wright, supra note 27, at 779-82; Carrington, supra note 74, at 554; MACCRATE,
APPELLATE JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 87; Rosenberg, supra note 28, at 662.
194. Wright, supra note 27, at 779-81.
195. See infra notes 209-10.




and authority of the trial court does not justify allowing erroneous rulings to
stand.197 Further, the desire to enhance the power and prestige of trial
courts cannot alone explain why appellate courts should review some trial
court decisions and not others. 198
A second objection to appellate review concerns the loss of the trial
court's superior ability to make certain decisions based on its day-to-day
involvement in the case and live contacts with the lawyers and litigants. 199
Unquestionably, aspects of pretrial and trial procedure require a decision
based on live testimony and informal contact with the lawyers not found in a
written record. These requirements, however, provide an argument for ad-
justing the standard of review rather than for eliminating it entirely.
The empirical data indicates that the Texas courts have, perhaps uncon-
sciously, developed a shifting standard of review that allows the trial court
greater deference in areas in which the trial judge's greater access to the
parties provides an advantage. First, mandamus is generally not available to
review the very discretionary area of discovery sanctions. 2° ° Second, appel-
late courts will not grant mandamus when the parties dispute the relevant
and controlling facts.20 1 Thus, the appellate court tends not to second guess
the judge's fact-finding if the trial court applied the correct standard. Third,
the appellate courts usually give greater deference to trial court rulings on
relevance issues.20 2 However, when the trial court has primarily interpreted
a legal rule, and done so incorrectly, the courts of appeals show very little
deference to the trial court's discretion.
20 3
The trial judge's immediate involvement in the case may give the judge a
personal investment in the dispute and its outcome so that the judge can no
longer be completely impartial, thus providing a reason for making review
available. 204 The trial judges' immediate involvement in the case, then, is a
197. Redish, supra note 24, at 105-06; Note, supra note 18, at 1052.
198. Cf Rosenberg, supra note 28, at 662 ("Conferring near-finality on trial court orders
by restrictive review practices dampens the possibility of... abuse. But ... , the reason is non-
selective. It fails to offer criteria indicating which lower court rulings are shielded by discre-
tion and which are not ... .
199. Id. at 662-63.
200. See, e.g., Street v. Second Court of Appeals, 715 S.W.2d 638, 639 (Tex. 1986) (manda-
mus relief for discovery sanctions inappropriate since the sanctioned party has adequate relief
through appeal); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Street, 761 S.W.2d 587, 589 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1988, orig. proc.) (mandamus request for discovery sanctions denied since Wal-Mart
had adequate remedy through appeal); Central Freight Line, Inc. v. White, 731 S.W.2d 121,
122 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, orig. proc.) (no mandamus granted since appeal is
the adequate remedy for discovery sanctions).
201. Jessen Assoc., Inc. v. Bullock, 531 S.W.2d 593, 602 (Tex. 1975); Norvell & Sutton,
supra note 52, at 179-80.
202. See C-Tran Dev. Corp. v. Chambers, 772 S.W.2d 294, 296 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1989, orig. proc.) (refusing to find trial judge abused discretion in relevancy
determination).
203. See Lunsford v. Morris, 746 S.W.2d 471, 473 (Tex. 1988) (defendant's net worth dis-
coverable in punitive damages case).
204. Carrington, supra note 74, at 551. As Carrington aptly noted,
Vanity and pride of opinion are additional obstacles; even very sensitive, in-
telligent, and self-disciplined judges must be troubled at times by their own in-
volvements of ego. By providing supervision, we keep the various decision
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reason to limit review, but is also a reason to make review available.
A third reason for limiting appellate review derives from the value our
legal system places on finality. At some point in time, the court must resolve
a dispute so that the litigants can go on to other matters. As a value, finality
reflects "a desire to limit the time between the eruption of a dispute, its reso-
lution, and the implementation of a solution. ' 20 5 Finality of judicial deci-
sions fulfills our psychological need for repose, furthers our political desire
to end government intervention in people's lives as soon as possible, and
promotes the judicial system's need for stability.
2°6
The goal of finality, however, competes with the goal of revisionism. Soci-
ety may prefer to allow review to correct error, to give some decisions more
meaning by having them made repeatedly and by more prestigious decision
makers, or to give litigants a sense of being fully and fairly heard. 20 7 The
need for speedy final decisions, then, must be balanced against other values.
Another set of factors supports the use of appellate review. The availabil-
ity of appellate review may: (1) create greater consistency in decisionmak-
ing; (2) allow decisions to be made at a level with greater comparative ability
or resources; and (3) provide a greater number of correct decisions.
In transferring power from a single decisionmaker (the trial judge) to mul-
tiple decisionmakers (the appellate judges), the judicial system allows for
greater consistency and greater accountability. Individual judges with busy
dockets have a limited amount of time to confer with their colleagues and
agree to adopt uniform approaches to certain issues. Thus, particularly with
respect to decisions that are within the trial court's discretion, 208 litigants
may receive widely divergent rulings from different judges, even in the same
geographical location. Appellate review, and especially appellate review that
results in reported opinions, can help to remedy this situation. If the appel-
late court is consistent, it can fix disparities and inequities produced by
the trial courts20 9 and promote consistency among the trial level
decisionmakers. 21
0
makers operating within an institutional framework. Remoteness of the re-
viewer from the firing line of trial can assure greater objectivity for the institu-
tional process.
Id.
205. Resnik, supra note 189, at 854-55. So defined, finality may actually be a re-statement
of the concerns already discussed. The desire for finality is, in part, an objection to delay, to
procedures that add to the courts' caseloads, and to procedures that second-guess the original
decision makers. See id. at 855.
206. Id. at 855.
207. Id.
208. Professor Rosenberg defines this trial-court level discretion as a "decision-liberating
choice." Rosenberg, supra note 28, at 638.
209. Resnik, supra note 189, at 866. It is also possible, of course, that appellate review
merely moves the problems of inconsistency and bias into a higher tier of decisionmaking. Id.
The collegial nature of appellate decisionmaking and the visibility of their decisions may help
to alleviate this problem. See infra text accompanying notes 210-12.
210. Friendly, supra note 66, at 758. The existence of Texas Supreme Court cases on vari-
ous discovery issues, and of rule amendments enacted in response to those cases, has allowed
greater consistency in the interpretation and enforcement of the discovery rules. Splits in au-
thority, however, have occurred at the court of appeals level. Compare National Union Fire
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Second, appellate judges have certain advantages not shared by most trial
level judges that may make their decisions preferable in at least certain cases.
For example, in many court systems appellate judges are more carefully se-
lected, better paid, and possess greater job security than do trial judges.21
These advantages tend to attract more qualified potential judges to the ap-
pellate rather than the trial bench. Also, appellate judges tend to have more
time for research and deliberation than do their colleagues in the trial courts.
Appellate judges may have superior support services, such as bright recent
law school graduates serving as law clerks, or better libraries.212
The very nature of appellate decisionmaking makes it preferable in certain
cases. The use of multiple judges to make appellate decisions produces a
collective decision that may be better than that produced by any single
judge. 213 Appellate decisionmaking also brings a broader base of values into
operation, reducing the tendency of judicial decisions to reflect individual
biases. 214 In addition, the issues involved are often more focused at the ap-
pellate level than they were in the trial court. Because of this, the briefs at
the appellate level tend to identify more clearly the issue involved and may,
in many cases, be better written and researched than those briefs (if any)
presented to the trial judge.215
A third factor supporting the use of appellate review is a feeling, probably
unverifiable, 2 16 that appellate judges are correct more often than trial judges.
Ins. Co. v. Hoffman, 746 S.W.2d 305, 309 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, orig. proc.) (party may
preserve privilege claim by objecting and requesting hearing within a reasonable time) with
National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Hunter, 741 S.W.2d 592, 595 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1987, orig. proc.) (party wishing to preserve privilege claim must file motion specifically plead-
ing exemption relied on). Even such splits, however, can lead eventually to consistency. For
example, the supreme court has recently adopted an amendment to the discovery rules clarify-
ing that either an objection or a motion for protective order is sufficient to preserve the party's
right to assert an objection to discovery, unless the objection or motion is set for hearing. TEX.
R. Civ. P. 166b(4).
211. As of September 1, 1988, the annual state salary paid to a justice of the supreme court
was $80,371. The base salary for justices of the courts of appeals was $72,334. The Texas
Government Code authorizes the counties in each court of appeals district to pay each justice a
sum not to exceed $15,000 per year for judicial and administrative services rendered in addi-
tion to the base state salary, but the total salary must be at least $1,000 less than the state
salary paid to a justice of the supreme court. See TEX. GOV'T. CODE ANN. § 51.602 (Vernon
1988); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6813b, § 3 (Vernon Supp. 1989). The base salary of
district judges was $57,258. Various sections of the Government Code authorize the counties
to supplement this salary, but the total salary of the district judges is limited to $1,000 less
than the combined yearly salary from state and county sources received by justices of the
courts of appeals in whose district the district court is located. JUDICIAL REPORT, supra note
82, at 96-101.
212. Appellate courts in Texas have access to briefing attorneys, hired for a period of one
year, and staff attorneys who generally serve the court for longer periods of time. The trial
court judges, however, do not have law clerks of any kind.
213. Friendly, supra note 66, at 757.
214. Carrington, supra note 74, at 551. Of course, if the appellate judges as a group possess
certain biases, appellate review will not eliminate those biases.
215. In Texas courts, motions are not often briefed at the trial level. It is more common for
attorneys to appear at motion hearings bearing xerox copies of the relevant cases (sometimes
with the most favorable language highlighted for the benefit of the trial judge). In mandamus
proceedings, on the other hand, the rules require the petition to be accompanied by "authori-
ties" supporting the petition. TEX. R. APP. P. 121(a)(2)(E).
216. Wright, supra note 27, at 782 ("There is no way to know for sure whether trial courts
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Many of the factors discussed above support this feeling: appellate courts
are in a position to be correct more often, and appellate courts render deci-
sions made by greater numbers of generally more qualified decisionmakers
with greater leisure and resources to make a decision.
The very existence of appellate review also supports the feeling of correct-
ness. The system is set up on an assumption that the decisions of trial courts
will sometimes need correcting, and that the decisions of the appellate
courts are the ones that win in the event of a conflict between the two. 217 As
Supreme Court Justice Jackson remarked, "[w]e are not final because we are
infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final."' 218 Whether or not
appellate decisions are correct in some Platonic sense, then, our system as-
sumes them to be more correct than the decisions of trial courts.
In summary, the extent to which we want to allow review generally de-
pends on whether the costs of review, namely decreasing confidence in trial
courts, losing the advantage of trial judge immediacy, and delaying finality,
are outweighed by the advantages of review, namely diffusion of power, con-
sistency, and better resources to produce correct decisions. In addition, sev-
eral characteristics of discovery disputes in particular make interlocutory
appellate review desirable.
First, pretrial rather than trial activity has become the center of gravity in
civil litigation.219 This shift has implications for the continued vitality of the
final judgment rule. Since the majority of cases settle prior to trial, pretrial
decisions become effectively unreviewable if we insist on waiting until the
end of trial and final judgment before allowing review. Therefore, certain
kinds of pretrial orders should be subject to interlocutory review.
At the same time that activity has shifted to pretrial activity, trial judges
have acquired greater and greater discretion in their rulings in discovery
matters, both in traditional judicial functions and in the new judicial role of
case manager.220 A great number of trial court decisions revolve around
flexible concepts such as whether information is "reasonably calculated to
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence" 221 or whether the relevance of
the requested information outweighs the burden of discovery requests. Ab-
sent appellate review at a meaningful time, this exercise of discretion is effec-
tively unreviewable. These very discretionary decisions, however, specially
require review. These decisions represent the kind of decisions most apt to
vary from judge to judge, and the kind most susceptible to an individual
or appellate courts are more often right."); see also Resnik, supra note 189, at 855 (error cor-
rection is a problematic reason for revisionism).
217. "Finality sometimes yields to revisionism simply because we prefer decisions authored
by revising judges over those issued by a first judge, and the revising judge gets his or her
authority by outranking the others." Resnik, supra note 189, at 856.
218. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
219. Galanter, Landscape, supra note 7, at 45.
220. Atiyah, From Principles to Pragmatism: Changes in the Function of the Judicial Pro-
cess and the Law, 65 IOWA L. REV. 1249, 1255-58 (1980); see Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96
HARv. L. REV. 376, 411 (1982)[hereinafter Managerial Judges].
221. For example, discovery must be "reasonably" calculated to lead to admissible evi-
dence. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c); TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(2)(a).
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judge's biases. At least one commentator has speculated that such discre-
tionary decisions should be made by the appellate courts.222
In a system where trial court decisions are unreported and have no prece-
dential value, the creation of a body of reported appellate case law regarding
discovery has substantial value. Case law on discovery promotes uniform
interpretation of the discovery rules and, in time, decreases the opportunity
for individual judge's biases to shape discovery outcomes. Reported deci-
sions develop clear rules, where rules are possible, and narrow the range of
judicial discretion in other areas simply by providing numerous cases finding
that the trial court did or did not abuse its discretion.223 Such case law can
be particularly helpful in a jurisdiction that has recently amended its discov-
ery rules. 224 Over time, the existence of discovery case law may even clarify
the rules sufficiently so as to decrease the number of disputes in the trial
court.
Appellate courts have two roles. They must settle disputes fairly in indi-
vidual cases, and they must provide incentives and disincentives for various
types of behavior by creating, and making public, consistent rules of law. 225
These roles sometimes conflict with each other. In the context of reviewing
discovery orders, however, the appellate courts serve both functions by pro-
viding corrected results in individual cases and by creating a body of cases
that will guide the trial courts.
The data indicates that interlocutory review of discovery orders has not
disrupted the comparative roles of the trial and appellate courts in the way
Professor Wright feared. As noted above, review has not been an important
source of court congestion or delay. Nor has the existence of review de-
creased the prestige or authority of the trial judges, who yearly make
thousands of decisions not subjected to interlocutory review.226 Also, the
speed with which the appellate courts handle mandamus cases minimizes the
effect of the review process on finality.227 In some ways, interlocutory re-
view actually contributes to finality when it promotes settlements or elimi-
nates discovery issues as grounds for an ultimate appeal.
Interlocutory review of discovery orders shifts power from trial courts to
appellate courts. Such a shift is appropriate, and its benefits far outweigh its
costs. Appellate courts can accomplish interlocutory review without sub-
222. The commentator noted, "Is it, perhaps, time to think seriously about our widespread
use of single judges to decide issues which involve so much discretion? Again, should there not
be more open recognition of the fact that the wider discretions are more appropriately exer-
cised by higher decisionmakers?" Atiyah, supra note 220, at 1271; see Friendly, supra note 66,
at 755.
223. In this sense, a standard of review more stringent than "abuse of discretion" would be
preferable, or at least an abuse of discretion standard that allowed a narrower range of accepta-
ble decisions. Apparently, the Texas courts have evolved just such a system of review,
although they have not clearly articulated what that standard of review is.
224. Cooper, supra note 21, at 162. The Texas legislature amended the discovery portions
of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure in 1984 and 1988.
225. Atiyah, supra note 220, at 1249-50.
226. In Dallas County, for example, trial judges participated in a minimal number of cases
involving mandamus review. See supra note 118.
227. See supra text accompanying notes 113-17.
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stantial loss of prestige in the trial court. Interlocutory review also allows
appellate review that existed in theory but not in reality when only final trial
court orders could be reviewed. In the discretionary world of discovery or-
ders, appellate review is particularly well-suited to even out trial court incon-
sistencies. Interlocutory review also serves to correct trial court errors in the
application of generally non-discretionary principles such as privilege rules
at a time when correction can be meaningful.
228
VI. WHAT MAKES THE SYSTEM WORK: A MODEL FOR
INTERLOCUTORY REVIEW OF DISCOVERY ORDERS
Interlocutory review of discovery orders, accomplished through a discre-
tionary review system, is not the demon that some fear it to be. Empirical
data indicates that such review creates minimal increases in trial and appel-
late court delay, and provides the opportunity for the courts of appeals to
impose some consistency on the trial courts' approach to discovery rulings.
Although interlocutory review, in theory, allows the use of review for har-
assment and delay, 229 the delay in fact has been minimal. Further, the case
law resulting from the review process outweighs any tendency of review to
benefit defendants or wealthy litigants generally.
Mandamus is not the only available model of interlocutory review of dis-
covery orders. Certain features of this system, however, are necessary in
order to provide the optimal balance of efficiency and fairness. An interlocu-
tory review system must have six important features to avoid problems of
court congestion and manipulation by wealthy litigants.
First, the system of interlocutory review should be relatively speedy, inex-
pensive, and procedurally straightforward. One of the dangers of interlocu-
tory review is wealthy litigants' use of the process to increase costs and
delay. A system that disposes of cases quickly and cheaply will not en-
courage such behavior. Disincentives to use of review for delay purposes
will help both the litigants and the courts; the litigants will avoid the delay
and the courts will experience a smaller caseload. Further, a procedurally
simple review system avoids giving undue advantages to litigants with access
to more sophisticated and (usually) more expensive lawyers. A review sys-
tem that works fairly must minimize procedural obstacles that can skew out-
228. Cf Managerial Judges, supra note 220, at 433 (Congress should amend Title 28 to
allow some sort of appellate review of judges' management decisions).
229. It may be possible in any jurisdiction to structure the rules so as to discourage frivo-
lous use of interlocutory review. A number of commentators have suggested that some sort of
penalty should attach to frivolous motions or that the losing party in a mandamus action
should pay its opponent's costs, including attorney's fees. Such provisions, however, will be
subject to the same kind of problems that have arisen in assessing discovery sanctions generally
and in Rule 11 disputes in the federal courts. The sanction problem could be particularly
severe where, as here, the operative standard of review is a moving target. It is also important
not to create such a disincentive to seeking review that poorer litigants will be unable to take
the risk of pursuing legitimate interlocutory review. A sanction for clearly frivolous interlocu-




comes based on relative attorney competence rather than on the merits of
the issues before the appellate court.
Second, interlocutory review must allow review of both orders granting
discovery and orders denying discovery. A writ system that is used primar-
ily to allow review of orders granting discovery over claims of privilege is not
sufficient.230 Systems in which parties secure review of discovery orders
through a refusal to comply with a discovery order, resulting in a contempt
order from the trial court that parties can appeal immediately, are also inad-
equate.231 Systems of review available only for grants of discovery over priv-
ilege claims favor privilege holders over the party seeking discovery: the
former can obtain interlocutory review but the latter cannot. Under current
law, privilege holders in civil litigation tend to be institutions rather than
individuals, and tend to be among the more wealthy and powerful segments
of society. 232 A review system that gives priority (that is, immediate review)
to the complaints of privilege holders, but which consigns the complaints of
parties seeking discovery until after final judgment, gives an advantage to
those wealthy institutional litigants. They have the power to achieve more
favorable results during the pretrial process; their opponents must wait. The
decision to allow interlocutory review of one kind of order but not the other
is a procedural choice, but one which has serious political implications.
Using contempt of court as a vehicle for achieving review has other draw-
backs as well. The confused state of existing case law makes it unclear
whether a civil contempt order against a party is immediately appealable.233
A party in contempt also runs the risk of receiving a penalty that will be
found to be criminal rather than civil contempt; this would invoke the prin-
ciple that appeals of criminal contempt orders review only the court's power
to enter the order and not the underlying order itself.234 Even if review is
available, a party choosing contempt as a vehicle for review puts itself in
some jeopardy:
Resort to [contempt] would be feasible only when the party or lawyer
risking punishment could count on leniency because the purpose was to
230. See Haddad, The Common Law Writ of Certiorari n Florida, 29 U. FLA. L. REV. 207,
224 (1977) (many cases granting certiorari to review interlocutory orders granting discovery,
but certiorari from an order denying discovery more likely to be denied); Wetherington, Appel-
late Review of Final and Non-Final Orders in Florida Civil Cases - An Overview, 47 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 61, 82, 84 (Summer 1984).
231. Parties seeking discovery do not have the contempt route available to them. While a
person can be held in contempt for refusing to obey a discovery order, a court denying discov-
ery has provided no order to disobey. Contempt-driven systems, then, allow review only of
orders granting discovery.
232. See supra text accompanying notes 178-80.
233. The general rule for non-discovery matters is that a civil contempt order entered
against a party, as opposed to a non-party, cannot be appealed until the end of the lawsuit.
While the general rule would allow interlocutory review in discovery cases, the courts are not
uniform in this approach. See Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 692
F.2d 1083, 1087 (7th Cir. 1982).
234. See Dobbs, Contempt of Court: A Survey, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 183, 241-43 (1971);
Moskovitz, Contempt of Injunctions, Civil and Criminal, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 780, 780 (1943).
See also United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258, 291-94 (1947); ITT
Community Dev. Corp. v. Barton, 569 F.2d 1351, 1356 (5th Cir. 1978).
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obtain a prompt appellate ruling before the client suffered severe irrepa-
rable injury, or when the result of obeying the order would be serious
enough to justify running the risk of substantial punishment and the
likelihood of reversal was substantial.... Needless to say, such a means
of obtaining review of an interlocutory order should only be used in
extremis, both because the outcome in terms of penalty or sanction can-
not be predicted and may be very unpleasant and because no lawyer or
party wants to deliberately place himself in the position of disregarding
the order of a court.
235
The potentially gigantic size of the contempt sanction also makes this kind
of review more available to wealthy litigants than to poorer ones.
The existence of the contempt model of review creates a one-sided review
process available only to those resisting discovery. It provides that review,
however, at a price that discourages its use. The litigant balances the utility
and cost of immediate appeal from that litigant's perspective, rather than the
trial or appellate court from the perspective of both parties and the judicial
system.
A third critical feature of a manageable interlocutory review system is the
discretionary nature of the review. Appellate courts should retain the option
of summarily denying relief without a written opinion and without an exten-
sive review of the merits. This system allows review to exist and it reduces
the burdens on the appellate courts. States in which a party unhappy with a
pretrial order can secure review of right have found a greater problem of
congestion and delay.236 States with discretionary procedures, on the other
hand, have achieved a better balance of access and burden.
237
A fourth and related feature needed for an effective system of interlocu-
tory review is the use of single-tier discretion. In some systems, notably in
the federal courts, interlocutory review is usually unavailable unless both the
235. R. Stern, supra note 33, at 100-01; see also Redish, supra note 24, at 123 ("Such a
Draconian practice exacts a high price from a party or non-party witness wishing to challenge
a discovery order."). But see Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 692
F.2d 1083, 1088 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.) ("Confining the right to appellate review of dis-
covery orders to cases where the party against whom the order was directed cared enough to
incur a sanction for contempt is a crude but serviceable method of identifying really burden-
some discovery orders, and waiving the finality rule only for them.").
236. Korn, Civil Jurisdiction of the New York Court of Appeals and Appellate Divisions, 16
BUFFALO L. REv. 307, 330 (1967). Efforts to limit the availability of review in New York
failed because of "widespread opposition among members of the bar." See also Project, Appel-
late Division, supra note 84, at 930; MACCRATE, APPELLATE JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 87.
Further, a survey of appellate division justices revealed that 19 of the 34 justices favored the
continuation of appeals as of right. Id.
237. Christian, supra note 86, at 120 ("[A]lthough mandamus is said not to be available as
a substitute for an appeal, the recent decisions have allowed extraordinary relief even where
the offending orders are directly appealable. This development is anomalous in theory, but
appears to be healthy; it promotes substantial justice when, in the discretion of the appellate
court, immediate intervention is a practical necessity. Because the remedy is discretionary on
the part of appellate courts having strong motives to avoid unnecessarily increasing their
caseloads, the remedy will be used sparingly."); Clifford, Civil Interlocutory Appellate Review
in New Jersey, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 87, 100 (Summer 1984) (interlocutory appeals
allowed "in the interest of justice" at the discretion of the appellate court); Kleinschmidt,
supra note 85, at 110 (review by "special action procedure" that replaced the writs of certio-
rari, mandamus, and prohibition).
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trial and appellate courts agree to immediate review. The federal discretion-
ary review statute, for example, provides for interlocutory review of orders
certified by the district judge as involving a controlling question of law about
which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion, the immediate
resolution of which will materially advance the ultimate disposition of the
litigation. 238 Under this system, either the district court or the court of ap-
peals may deny review. District courts have almost absolute discretion in
denying section 1292(b) certifications.
239
A system that confines the exercise of discretion to the appellate court has
several advantages. First, it is simpler. Second, it avoids the duplication of
effort inherent in having two courts make a preliminary determination con-
cerning whether an order should be appealable. Third, a single-tier system
avoids requiring the trial court to try to be objective about the wisdom of its
own order. Although the two-tier system is designed to cut down on the
number of appealable orders, systems using a one-tier discretionary appeal
have not experienced a flood of unwarranted applications.
24°
A fifth crucial feature for a system of interlocutory review is a standard of
review with teeth. The value of interlocutory review declines as the standard
of review is restricted and the probability of reversal is diminished, so that
the review procedure becomes a source of expense and delay but not of re-
lief.241 If the appellate court will change few orders, the costs to the courts
and parties of allowing review quickly begin to outweigh the benefits.
A more rigorous standard of review is also necessary in order to achieve
the benefits review can provide in adding uniformity and predictability to the
judicial system. Although discovery is traditionally within the discretion of
the trial court,242 the exercise of that discretion should be fairly consistent
from court to court so that outcomes do not ride too heavily on the vagaries
of case assignment. A court of appeals that must defer to the trial court in
all but the most outrageous cases cannot effectively encourage such consis-
tency. A court of appeals using a less deferential standard of review can,
238. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (Supp. 1987). Section 1292 also has substantive weaknesses.
First, it considers only efficiency; issues of hardship or injustice are not relevant to a district
judge's determination of appealability. Second, case law has limited § 1292 to "extraordinary"
cases, so that courts seldom grant requests for appeal under this section. See Robbins Co. v.
Laurence Mfg. Co., 482 F.2d 426, 429 (9th Cir. 1973) (appeal from order denying motion for
summary judgment); cf Gellhorn & Larsen, Interlocutory Appeal Procedures in Administrative
Hearings, 70 MICH. L. REV. 109, 137 (1971) (trial judges certify interlocutory ruling in only
one-tenth of one percent of all cases; § 1292(b) thus mere "crack in the otherwise impenetrable
wall insulating trial court procedures for appellate review").
239. D'Ippolito v. Cities Service Co., 374 F.2d 643, 649 (2d Cir. 1967) (mandamus never
appropriate to compel district judge to certify appeal under § 1292(b)).
240. R. STERN, supra note 33, at 89 (all four of the arguments encompassed in paragraph
in text are noted in Stem).
241. Cooper, supra note 21, at 159.
242. Cf Tuchler, Discretionary Interlocutory Review in Missouri: Judicial Abuse of the
Writ?, 40 Mo. L. REV. 577, 579 (1975) ("When a trial judge has discretion in the administra-
tion of procedural rules, the exercise of discretion may be the result of the most improper
motives and have nothing to do with his attitude concerning the proper conduct of trial, but




through case law and through decisions in individual cases, create guidelines
for discovery and correct deviations from those guidelines.
Finally, interlocutory review should be a one-track procedure. A party
wanting interlocutory review of a discovery order should seek relief through
a single recognized avenue of discretionary review. Contrast this with other
systems, where multiple, overlapping and conflicting routes of review are
available. In the federal courts, for example, a party seeking interlocutory
review must sort through the statutory morass of certification under section
1292, certification under Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
and applications for writ of mandamus.243 A party seeking interlocutory
review must also contend with the court-made exceptions to the final judg-
ment rule: the collateral order doctrine, 244 the hardship exception,245 the
death knell doctrine, 246 and the use of a contempt order to allow immediate
review. 247 The existence of multiple avenues of review encourages litigants
to seek review under a variety of rules, increasing costs to the litigants and
workload for the appellate courts. The complexity such a system generates
also tends to favor those able to afford sophisticated lawyers who can cope
with the tangled options, and who know how to circumvent the final judg-
ment rule.
VII. CONCLUSION
Interlocutory review of discovery orders is not as bad as the commenta-
tors feared, but is it good? No empirical data is available to determine
whether or in what way interlocutory review affects trial outcomes or settle-
ment agreements. Some things, however, can be said. Interlocutory review
of discovery orders would add a modest number of cases to appellate
caseloads at a time when the trend is to contract the jurisdiction of appellate
courts. The benefits of interlocutory review, however, outweigh this small
increase in workload. Interlocutory review provides (1) increased dissemi-
nation of information relevant to litigation; (2) more even dissemination of
relevant information between plaintiffs and defendants; (3) greater protec-
tion for genuinely privileged information; and (4) more accurate use of the
discovery rules. Without interlocutory review, litigants seldom possess an
effective way to modify a discovery order that erroneously denies or grants
discovery. While this kind of practical finality of trial court orders may fos-
ter efficiency, it also promotes unfairness to a party aggrieved by a discovery
243. The federal courts occasionally use writs of mandamus to correct discovery orders.
See Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104 (1964). The federal courts, however, tend to limit
mandamus to instances of significant erroneous practice that the appellate court finds likely to
recur. Redish, supra note 24, at 114.
244. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545-47 (1949).
245. Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 201, 204-05 (1848).
246. United States v. Wood, 295 F.2d 772, 776-78 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S.
850 (1962). But see Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469-76 (1978) (rejecting
death knell doctrine in context of denial of class certification).
247. In the words of one commentator, "there are occasions when inelegance in the legal




order. Unquestionably, courts must concern themselves about efficiency and
delay. However, "courts are about something more fundamental than sav-
ing money or operating smoothly and speedily. While expeditiousness is
surely a goal to be pursued by the courts, few would argue that it is the only
goal.,, 248
Interlocutory review of discovery orders is beneficial. It can particularly
help in jurisdictions where the appellate judges possess significantly superior
qualifications and tenure than the trial judges. It will be less disruptive to
the appellate courts in jurisdictions where the appellate courts are ade-
quately staffed with judges and support staff and use efficient court manage-
ment techniques. 249 Interlocutory review can also particularly help in
providing guidance to trial courts in areas where the law is uncertain as, for
example, where a jurisdiction has recently amended the discovery rules.250
All things considered, apoplexy 251 is not in order. Interlocutory review of
discovery orders has not created significant burdens or delays in either the
trial or appellate courts. While defendants and institutional litigants have a
tendency to use review more, they win it less. Further, interlocutory review
allows the appellate courts to circumscribe the scope of trial court discretion
in discovery matters in a way that should make the rulings on discovery
issues more uniform throughout the jurisdiction. Interlocutory review of
discovery orders is not a procedure from hell but a match made in heaven.
248. MAHONEY, supra note 9, at 206, (quoting T. Church, From the Editor, 12, No. 1, 6
(1987)); see also Rosenberg, Court Congestion: Status, Causes, and Remedies, in H.W. JONES
(ed.), THE COURTS, THE PUBLIC AND THE LAW EXPLOSION (1965) ("Slow justice is bad, but
speedy injustice is not an admissible substitute").
249. Appellate courts may be able to utilize support personnel, such as staff attorneys with
longer tenure than one-year law clerks, to become expert in original proceedings and in the law
governing discovery disputes. They may also develop streamlined procedures for handling
interlocutory review issues. This combination of clear procedures and accumulated expertise
may help decrease the burden that the appellate courts feel because of what they perceive as
the "emergency" nature of mandamus practice.
250. Cooper, supra note 21, at 163 ("Important procedural innovations may warrant spe-
cial patterns of review during the early years").
251. See supra text accompanying note 3.
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